“Star-level arrows, arrow-level fields” are currently one of the biggest pain points in China’s commercial aerospace industry. Satellites and rockets are built, but they are waiting in line for launch, which has become the most realistic portrayal of the industry.<\/p>\n
Based on the latest data, this article systematically analyzes the real pattern of China’s commercial space launch sites from the aspects of launch site status, gaps, development paths, etc.<\/p>\n
01<\/p>\n
China Space Launch Site Layout<\/p>\n
According to the latest statistics from Nihao Space, China has: four traditional space launch sites: Jiuquan, Xichang, Taiyuan, and Wenchang; three major commercial space launch sites: Dongfeng Commercial Space Innovation Pilot Zone, Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site, and Oriental Space Port; Yangjiang, Fangchenggang, Liangshan, Ningbo, Shanghai, Lianyungang, Rizhao and other places are planning to build commercial space launch sites. <\/p>\n
1. Four traditional space launch sites<\/p>\n
Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center: Also known as “Dongfeng Space City”, it is the earliest and largest comprehensive space launch center in my country and the only manned space launch site at present. It is mainly used to carry out the launch missions of scientific experiment satellites, returnable satellites and manned spaceflight in medium and high inclination orbits.<\/p>\n
Xichang Satellite Launch Center: mainly undertakes national tasks and is less open to business. It is the earliest space launch site in my country that opened to the outside world and has strong comprehensive capabilities. It is mainly used for the launch mission of broadcasting, communication and meteorological satellites into geosynchronous orbit.<\/p>\n
Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center: Almost closed to commercial launches. It is mainly responsible for the launch missions of various types of low-orbit satellites such as sun-synchronous orbit meteorology, resources, and communications.<\/p>\n
Wenchang Space Launch Site: Suitable for medium and large liquid rockets, it is affiliated to the Xichang Satellite Launch Center. It is China’s first open coastal space launch base and one of the few low-latitude launch sites in the world. It is mainly responsible for the launch missions of geosynchronous orbit satellites, large-mass polar orbit satellites, large-tonnage space stations and deep space exploration satellites.<\/p>\n
2. Three major commercial space launch sites<\/p>\n
Dongfeng Commercial Aerospace Innovation Test Zone: It is a “special zone” opened by Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center to support the development of commercial aerospace. It is mainly responsible for commercial rocket launch tasks. At present, most of the self-built workstations of private rocket companies are located here. Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site: It is my country’s first commercial space launch site and the core launch base for future liquid rockets. Since the first successful launch in November 2024, 14 launch missions have been completed within 18 months. Vostok Spaceport: An important addition to current commercial launches. It is currently my country’s only commercial aerospace sea launch home port. It mainly focuses on solid rocket launches, supplemented by sea launches, and has completed a total of 25 launches. In addition, Liangshan, Fangchenggang, Yangjiang, Ningbo, Shanghai, Lianyungang, Rizhao and other places are planning to build coastal launch sites. <\/p>\n
02<\/p>\n
Where are commercial rockets mainly launched?<\/p>\n
In 2025, China\u2019s commercial rockets launched a total of 29 times. The 27 launches were concentrated at the four launch sites of Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, Dongfeng Commercial Space Innovation Test Zone, Oriental Space Port, and Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site, accounting for 93%; Taiyuan was not open to commercial rockets throughout the year; Xichang and Wenchang only had one, and both were commercial launches by the national team. <\/p>\n
The bigger problem is liquid rockets.<\/p>\n
In 2025, liquid rockets will be launched a total of 9 times throughout the year, all of which were completed at dedicated workstations, and no general workstation was used once. Among them, Blue Arrow Aerospace used its own workstations 3 times, and Long March 8A relied on model-specific workstations 6 times (Hainan Shangfa No. 1 workstation 5 times, Wenchang 201 workstation 1 time). Both types of workstations are only open to builders or designated models, and are not shared with the industry.<\/p>\n
It can be seen that currently commercial rocket launches are almost crowded together, and most private rocket companies do not have launch stations. This is also the most realistic current state of the industry: commercial rockets can be launched, but not everyone can launch them, and they have to queue up.<\/p>\n
03<\/p>\n
The real bottleneck is the launch site<\/p>\n
Seeing this, many people will think that the problem lies in the shortage of workstations, which can be solved by building more workstations. But this only scratches the surface. The deeper problem lies in the launch site. 1. The launch station is insufficient and is being “locked”. According to Nihao Space statistics, my country currently has 79 rocket models in service, under development, and planning, 16 of which are scheduled to fly for the first time in 2026. As of now, there are about 15 commercial launch stations: 7 are built by companies for their own use; <\/p>\n
1 is Changba\u2019s exclusive work station;<\/p>\n
4 are under construction or under approval;<\/p>\n
2 are solid workstations.<\/p>\n
It can be seen that there is only one universal liquid station open to many enterprises, Hainan Shangfa No. 2.<\/p>\n
2. Self-built workstations cannot solve the problem. The real constraint lies in the launch site. Self-built workstations are a current trend in the rocket industry, but this does not fundamentally solve the problem. <\/p>\n
Because what really restricts rocket launches are airspace approval, sea area use, safety zoning, launch permits, etc., these need to be solved by the launch site.<\/p>\n
3. The development of reusable liquid rockets has changed the demand for internal and coastal launch sites.<\/p>\n
Inland launch sites represented by the Jiuquan area: The advantage is that they are vast and sparsely populated, suitable for mid-to-high inclination and sun-synchronous orbit launches and inland recovery tests, and have low safety management and control costs; the disadvantage is that the shooting direction options are limited, and the large-diameter rocket body relies on railway transportation, and its size is limited by the outline of the railway tunnel;<\/p>\n
Coastal launch sites, represented by the Wenchang area in Hainan, have the advantage of smooth shipping, low latitude, and stronger orbital capabilities with the same capacity, making them suitable for large-scale rocket launches; the disadvantage is that the first area is adjacent to towns, has great safety constraints, and has high near-field recovery risks. In addition, frequent weather such as typhoons, high temperatures, and humidity means that the launch window is compressed and operation and maintenance costs are high.<\/p>\n
Taken together, both types of launch sites have their own advantages and disadvantages under the current structure, but the large-scale, high-frequency, and recyclable needs of commercial liquid rockets are pointing the answer to the eastern coast.<\/p>\n
04<\/p>\n
Why does the launch have to go to the eastern coast?<\/p>\n
The location of the launch site is the primary factor affecting launch capabilities. More than 100 space launch sites around the world are distributed between 39\u00b0 south latitude and 63\u00b0 north latitude.<\/p>\n
For China’s commercial launch sites, more location factors need to be considered.<\/p>\n
1. Large-diameter liquid rockets rely more on water transportation<\/p>\n
Medium and large liquid rockets generally exceed 4 meters in diameter and cannot be transported long-distance by rail or road, and they rely more on water transportation.<\/p>\n
2. There are few restrictions on maritime recycling<\/p>\n
First-level recovery requires a large safe landing area, and the sea area can be deployed maneuverably, with far greater flexibility than inland areas.<\/p>\n
3. The aerospace industry is originally located in the eastern region<\/p>\n
More than 60% of liquid rocket factories are in the Yangtze River Delta, and about 40% of satellite manufacturing is in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. The manufacturing end is in the east, but the launch resources are in Jiuquan and Wenchang. Long-distance transportation from the east to the west increases the cost and cycle.<\/p>\n
In addition, the natural conditions in the East China Sea offshore also have advantages: good meteorological and hydrological conditions, less disastrous weather, and more launch days per year; the first landing area has good safety; the latitude covers 25\u00b0-31\u00b0, which can meet the requirements of various orbital inclination angles; and it does not involve land acquisition issues.<\/p>\n
The direction is very clear, what is missing is the landing speed of the launch site. Launch sites in Lianyungang, Ningbo Xiangshan, Shanghai and other places are still under planning and currently cannot handle the launch demand for commercial liquid rockets. What is lacking along the eastern coast is not site selection conditions, but a timetable for completion and commissioning.<\/p>\n
05<\/p>\n
How did SpaceX solve the launch problem?<\/p>\n
China’s commercial aerospace industry often talks about benchmarking against SpaceX, but the focus of comparison mostly falls on rocket technology. In fact, there is a hidden gap between the two sides in the launch system.<\/p>\n
1. Own launch site<\/p>\n
SpaceX has four core launch stations: Vandenberg Space Force Base SLC-4E, Cape Canaveral SLC-40, Kennedy Space Center LC-39A, and the completely own Starbase. The first three are long-term leases and the last one is owned and built. The four launch stations are all operated independently by SpaceX, and launch plans, station schedules, and test windows are all made internally.<\/p>\n
Falcon 9 has launched more than 630 times so far, and has completed 165 launches in 2025 alone. It has also achieved the shortest launch interval of about 50 hours for a single station. Behind this high-frequency transmission capability is essentially the system capability based on the integration of “launch site-workstation-scheduling system”.<\/p>\n
2. Integration of launch + recovery + testing High-frequency launch is not only a matter of transportation capacity, but also a matter of verification speed. The maturity of reusable technology requires a large amount of real launch and recovery data to support it. SpaceX\u2019s Falcon 9 first-stage recovery was only 15 months from its first successful land recovery in December 2015 to its first reuse flight in March 2017. Since then, the recovery success rate has continued to increase, and more than 600 successful recoveries have been completed so far. The premise of this speed is that the launch site and recovery area are owned by oneself, and the test window is not subject to external scheduling constraints. Starbase further concentrates manufacturing, testing, launch, and recycling in the same location, forming a closed loop of “shooting rockets at the factory door.” 3. The launch rhythm is independently controllable. For the commercial launch missions carried out by SpaceX itself, there is usually no need to apply for a launch window from the outside. The launch time is determined independently based on mission planning and orbital resources. In other words, SpaceX does not need to “apply for a window” from a third party, it is the maker of the window itself. The launch rhythm, recycling verification and even the technology iteration cycle are all controlled internally by the company. Even if an abnormality occurs that results in a grounding, the follow-up investigation and return-to-fly process will be led by the company and supervised by regulatory agencies, and the recovery cycle is usually measured in weeks or months. On the other hand, at China Commercial Rocket Company, launches need to be coordinated, queues need to be queued, windows need to be applied for, and recovery needs to be applied for separate landing areas. It can be seen that the gap between the two sides is not only the rocket, but also the control of launch rhythm. <\/p>\n
06<\/p>\n
How big is the gap in the future?<\/p>\n
Let\u2019s look at two sets of figures: Let\u2019s look at the demand side first. According to the latest statistics from Nihao Space, my country\u2019s constellation plans to launch a total of nearly 50,000 satellites. Most of them are planned to be deployed before 2030, with an average of about 10,000 satellites needed to be put into orbit every year. Based on a conservative calculation of 18 satellites per rocket, the annual launch requirement is about 555 times. Looking at the supply side, 10 commercial workstations have been put into use. Based on an ideal annual launch rate of 15 times for a single station, the total capacity is only 150 times; even if all five stations under construction are completed, the upper limit will only be 225 times. The 555-time demand corresponds to the 225-time capacity limit. In theory, the launch capacity needs to be at least doubled. Moreover, 225 times is only the upper limit on paper, and the actual effective launch capacity is even lower: the universal liquid station is only used by Hainan Shangfa No. 2, and launch conditions will only be available at the end of No. 3 and No. 4. The Dongfeng Commercial Aerospace Innovation Test Zone stations are all self-built and used by the company, closed and operated, and cannot be shared by the industry. In addition, multiple domestic liquid reusable rockets will undergo first-stage recovery verification starting in 2026, squeezing the already tight window; about 23 new liquid rockets will have their first flights by 2027, further amplifying the shortage of work station resources. A modern commercial launch site takes 3-5 years from planning to stable operation. <\/p>\n
07<\/p>\n
Development suggestions<\/p>\n
Recommendation 1: Accelerate the approval of commercial launch sites along the eastern coast. The eastern coast has the triple advantages of transportation, recycling and industrial clusters. The planning of launch sites in coastal provinces such as Shandong, Zhejiang and Guangdong needs to be accelerated. Recommendation 2: Support enterprises to participate in the construction and operation of launch sites. With reference to the SpaceX model, commercial rocket companies are encouraged to participate through self-construction, co-construction, long-term leasing, etc., so that enterprises can move from “borrowing windows” to “managing windows”. Recommendation 3: Build an integrated “star-arrow-field” layout to shorten the transportation distance, reduce the disassembly and assembly links, and compress the traditional long process into a short chain of “launch out of the factory”. The mission cycle has been shortened from dozens of days to several days, and the transshipment distance has been reduced from thousands of kilometers to hundreds of kilometers. In short, the layout of China’s commercial space launch sites should be based on Jiuquan and Wenchang, with Xichang as the strategic backup, expand the eastern coastal launch belt, and connect coastal launch sites such as Haiyang, Lianyungang, Ningbo, and Shanghai to form a “three points and one line” commercial launch system.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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