In the past year, rocket assembly bases have been built all over China, from Wenchang in Hainan to Yizhuang in Beijing, from the Yangtze River Delta to the western interior, and it seems that we have entered an era of overcapacity.<\/p>\n
But what is the real capacity? Can this capacity really be used?<\/p>\n
Today, Nihao Space will show you the real layout of China\u2019s rocket factory in 2026 based on the latest statistical data.<\/p>\n
01<\/p>\n
37 rocket factories<\/p>\n
As of April 2026, Nihao Space statistics show that China has a total of 37 rocket factories with complete rocket assembly capabilities, with a total planned production capacity of 610 rounds per year. (Note: This article only counts factories with complete rocket assembly and testing capabilities, and does not include single component production facilities such as engines and tanks.) <\/p>\n
Judging from the construction progress,<\/p>\n
Already put into production: 20 (accounting for 54%);<\/p>\n
Under construction: 12 (accounting for 32%);<\/p>\n
Planning: 5 (accounting for 14%).<\/p>\n
In terms of production capacity scale, the total planned production capacity of these 37 rocket factories is 610 rockets\/year: Production capacity in operation: 392 rockets\/year; Production capacity under construction: 198 rockets\/year; Planned production capacity: 20 rockets\/year. Judging from these figures, the number and production capacity of China’s rocket factories have entered a stage of rapid expansion. But the effective production capacity that can actually be converted into launch capabilities is far less than this number. In 2025, China will complete 92 launch rocket launches throughout the year, including 29 commercial rocket launches. Comparing production capacity and launch numbers, it is not difficult to see that although the number of rocket factories is growing, the actual production capacity that can be converted into launch capabilities is still very limited. <\/p>\n
02<\/p>\n
The battle over technical routes is over<\/p>\n
If you look at the 37 rocket factories together, you will find that the technical route of China’s rocket manufacturing is quickly unifying into one route: reusable liquid rockets. From the perspective of propellant types and usage methods, current Chinese rockets can be roughly divided into three categories: 1. Solid rockets – which are withdrawing from the main stage. Representative models include Jielong 3, Ceres 1, Kuaizhou series, Lijian 1, etc. Seven factories have been put into operation, with an annual production capacity of 154 rounds; one is under construction, with a planned annual production capacity of 10 rounds. This type of rocket is currently the main rocket for commercial space launches. It has a mature structure and fast response speed. However, its overall capacity is small and its cost cannot be reduced, making it difficult to support the construction of large-scale constellation networks. Therefore, in terms of new production capacity, solid rockets have almost stopped expanding. 2. Disposable liquid rocket – transition plan. Representative models include Suzaku-2, Tianlong-2, etc. Four factories have been put into operation, with an annual production capacity of 30 rounds; one is under construction, with a planned annual production capacity of 20 rounds. Compared with solid rockets, disposable liquid rockets have stronger performance, but they are still a one-time use model and are still unsustainable in terms of cost structure. Such factories are still expanding, but are no longer the focus of industry bets. Disposable liquid rockets are more inclined to the technology transition route and will undertake certain phased launch missions before the reusable rockets are fully mature. 3. Reusable liquid rocket – the real focus of the future industry. Representative models include Suzaku 3, Tianlong 3, Hyperbola 3, Pallas 1, Nebula 2, etc. 9 factories have been put into operation, with an annual production capacity of 208 rounds; 13 factories are under construction and planned, with a planned annual production capacity of 188 rounds. From the data point of view, reusable liquid rockets have become the largest technological direction at present. However, most of these models have not yet completed their first flight and recovery verification, and the factory has not completed the complete process, so mass production capabilities have not been truly realized. Therefore, much of this production capacity is only on paper. <\/p>\n
03<\/p>\n
Rocket factory site selection logic<\/p>\n
From the perspective of spatial distribution, 37 rocket factories are distributed in 15 provinces and cities. Among them, there are a total of 25 factories in Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong, Sichuan and Zhejiang provinces, with an annual production capacity of 418 rounds, accounting for about 70% of the country’s total. It is easy to draw wrong conclusions if you only look at the number of factories. What is really meaningful is to look at the regional distribution according to technical routes. 1. Solid rocket: layout around the launch site. Judging from the current production capacity and layout, solid rocket factories are mainly concentrated in: Shandong: 3 factories with an annual production capacity of 40 rockets. These factories are all concentrated at Hai Duong Oriental Spaceport. It has the only commercial sea launch home port in the country, which can realize the integration of “final assembly-factory-launch”. After the rocket rolls off the assembly line, it can directly board the ship and go to sea, converting production capacity into the number of launches most efficiently. Sichuan: 3 factories with an annual production capacity of 44 rounds. Relying on Sichuan’s original aerospace industry foundation and the local government’s strong investment promotion, it has attracted companies such as Star Glory and Galaxy Power to set up shop. At the same time, Sichuan is planning to build its own commercial space launch site. Once it is implemented, it will be upgraded from “manufacturing drive” to “manufacturing + launch” dual drive. Overall, the layout logic of the solid rocket factory is clear, and the core is centered around launch resources. Areas that can quickly convert production capacity into launch capabilities are prioritized, forming a layout model of “launch sites driving factories”. 2. Liquid rocket: Layout around manufacturing and transportation. Unlike solid rockets, the location of liquid rocket factories presents a highly consistent and more rigid logic: along the river and near the port + close to the manufacturing cluster. This is driven by two major hard constraints: Large-diameter rocket body transportation restrictions: The diameter of liquid rocket bodies generally exceeds 4 meters or more. Such sizes cannot be transported over long distances via rail tunnels or road bridges and must rely on inland or offshore shipping. Therefore, the factory needs to be located next to rivers, rivers and coastlines with navigable capabilities to achieve “boarding the ship immediately after leaving the factory”. Supply chain collaboration efficiency: Liquid rockets involve a large number of high-precision components such as engines, tanks, valves, and pipelines, and require parts suppliers to be within a reasonable transportation radius. With its mature machinery manufacturing, electronics, and composite materials industry clusters, the Yangtze River Delta region can support “hourly” supporting responses and significantly reduce inventory and logistics costs. Based on the above logic, China’s liquid rocket factories are highly concentrated in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and coastal areas: Jiangsu: 6 factories, with an annual production capacity of 150 rounds Anhui: 5 factories, with an annual production capacity of 74 rounds Zhejiang: 4 factories, with an annual production capacity of 50 rounds The three provinces have a total of 15 factories with an annual production capacity of 274 rounds, accounting for 61% of the country’s total liquid rocket production capacity. It is worth noting that the site selection constraints of liquid rockets are much stronger than that of solid rockets: solid rockets can be flexibly transported to different launch sites via roads or railways, while once a factory address is selected for liquid rockets, the main launch stations they serve are basically locked. This characteristic of “site selection is strategy” makes the competition for companies to acquire land and build factories in the early stage particularly fierce. <\/p>\n
04<\/p>\n
The essence of factory layout is “betting on the first flight”<\/p>\n
From an enterprise perspective, these 37 factories belong to 21 units, and leading companies have begun to form scale advantages in production capacity layout. On the surface, the industry has already seen a trend of \u201cmulti-base layout + large-scale expansion of production\u201d. However, the layout of these factories is essentially a huge gamble – the factories can be built in advance, but the first flight cannot be made in advance. At present, these 19 commercial aerospace companies can be roughly divided into three categories: Companies that already have launch capabilities: Blue Arrow Aerospace, Tianbing Technology, and China Science and Technology Aerospace have completed the first flight of reusable rockets. Their factory production capacity is transforming from planning to actual delivery, and the risks are relatively controllable. Companies on the verge of success: Star Glory, Galaxy Power, etc. have huge production capacity layouts, but are still on the eve of their first flight. The success of the first flight will directly determine whether these factories can be converted into commercial delivery capabilities. This is also a key node for industry differentiation in the next 1-2 years. Advanced production capacity: A large number of start-up companies that have not yet made their first flight are also building factories with advanced production capacity but unproven technology. Once the first flight fails, the production capacity invested in the early stage will quickly expire. <\/p>\n
05<\/p>\n
The real problem: capacity mismatch<\/p>\n
When many people see the production capacity of 610 rounds per year, they will come to the conclusion that China has a surplus of rockets. But this conclusion is wrong.<\/p>\n
The real situation is that there is not excess production capacity, but insufficient effective production capacity. This is essentially a structural capacity mismatch. What limits China’s rocket capabilities is not how many rockets can be built, but how many can be used.<\/p>\n
This problem is reflected in three aspects:<\/p>\n
First, solid rocket production capacity is losing demand. It has put into production solid rockets with an annual production capacity of 154, mainly serving small satellites and rapid response launches. However, in the future, mega-constellation networking will require large-capacity, low-cost, and reusable liquid rockets, and the market for solid rockets will become increasingly narrow. This 154 rounds\/year production capacity will be difficult to digest in the future. Second, there seems to be a lot of reusable liquid rocket production capacity, but very little can be used. The annual production capacity of reusable liquid rockets that has been put into production is 208, which seems to be a considerable scale, but two realities need to be looked at calmly: First, a large part of the production capacity is still in the ramp-up stage and has not yet truly passed the mass production process; second, many models have not yet completed recycling verification – production capacity that has not been successfully recycled is not considered real production capacity. Third, the real bottleneck is not in the factory. Even if factory production capacity keeps up, launch station resources, measurement and control systems, and launch rhythm are still hard constraints. In addition, the ability to realize technology is the key to determining victory or defeat – whose rocket can truly achieve low-cost, high-reliability reuse, and who can convert paper production capacity into market advantage. <\/p>\n
06<\/p>\n
Capacity first, ability second<\/p>\n
If we summarize the rocket factory layout in 2026, we can find a change taking place: production capacity construction is already ahead of technical capabilities. From the data point of view, there are a total of 17 factories under construction and planning, accounting for 46% of the total 37 factories; the annual production capacity is 218 rounds, accounting for 36% of the total planned production capacity. Notably, nearly half of this incremental capacity comes from startup rocket companies that have yet to complete their first flight. Various companies generally adopt the strategy of \u201cbuilding factories first, seizing production capacity, and waiting for the first flight\u201d to secure positions in advance. China already has 37 rocket factories and it seems to be very busy. But what ultimately determines the industry structure is who can take the lead in completing the engineering closed loop of reusable rockets. Until this problem is solved, most production capacity is only “potential capacity.”<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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