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\u201cBREAK, BREAK. Hold what you\u2019re doing,\u201d came over the loop during the EVA as the spacewalkers were talking , as controllers started to notice spikes in Cassidy\u2019s CO2 levels. It is not confirmed \u2013 but likely \u2013 that the spikes are related to a failing LiOH canister.<\/p>\n
However, the rising levels are not a health concern, allowing the EVA to move to some clean up tasks, ahead of transitioning back to the Quest Airlock to end the EVA early. UPDATE: Both Spacewalkers are now safely back into Quest.<\/p>\n
EVA-3 Tasks:<\/p>\n
According to the extensive Space Shuttle Program Flight Readiness Review (SSP FRR) \u2013 available for download on L2 \u2013 \u201cJAXA ICS-EF Payload Prep (Multi-Layer Insulation) and P6 Battery R&R \u2013 planned completion of 4 batteries \u2013 scheduled for EVA-3.\u201d<\/p>\n
Overall, the battery R&R are to place over two EVAs (beginning on EVA-3 and concluding on EVA-4). \u201cBatteries R&Red using two EVAs, nominally EVAs 3 (FD8) and 4 (FD10),\u201d notes the SSP FRR EVA overview document.<\/p>\n
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In preparation for this task, the 2B power channel on the International Space Station (ISS) was taken offline line following the completion of EVA-1 on FD-4 (Flight Day 4). This power channel will remain deactivated until the battery R&R operation is complete.<\/p>\n
Currently, the power channel is expected to be brought back online on FD-11. With this power channel offline, however, the power management aspects of the ISS have being effected \u2013 mainly in the area of determining the highest priority areas to receive power while this channel is offline.<\/p>\n
![\"E3\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E31.jpg\" "\\"E3\\"")
Furthermore, the plan for this mission was designed under the assumption that the Port SARJ (Solar Alpha Rotary Joint) would be able to rotate nominally between the two battery R&R EVAs while the Mobile Transporter platform is stationed and Work Site 8 \u2013 just to the inboard side of the Port SARJ.<\/p>\nNevertheless, a contingency power plan is available should SARJ rotation \u2013 for whatever reason \u2013 be impossible between the two EVAs.<\/p>\n
Additionally, mission planners have noted an area of trouble the EV crew might encounter during the spacewalk today.<\/p>\n
The issue, noted in the SSP FRR documents, pertains to a Flight Support Equipment (FSE) bolt that holds the possibility of jamming.<\/p>\n
\u201cIssue with the FSE where a bolt can jam when removing the battery from the ICC-VLD (Integrated Cargo Carrier \u2013 Vertical Lightweight Deployable); pin must be sheared to finish removal,\u201d notes the EVA section of the SSP FRR document.<\/p>\n
If this should occur, the presentation notes that Cassidy and Wolf may lose the ability to properly bolt the battery onto the IEA of the P6 truss \u2013 effectively preventing them from completely attachment the new battery to the Station.<\/p>\n
TPS Review:<\/p>\n
As has become the staple in the post-Columbia era, the Damage Assessment Team (DAT) has poured over thousands of images and videos since Endeavour\u2019s launch one week ago.<\/p>\n
![\"E4\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E41.jpg\" "\\"E4\\"")
As a result of all their hard work (and the careful and skillful dedication of the MAF workers who assembled ET-131), Endeavour has received a sparkling report from the DAT in regard to the condition of her TPS (Thermal Protection System).<\/p>\nIn fact, the DAT only noted 14 areas of damage or TPS \u201csoftgoods\u201d (areas of protruding gap fillers, raised thermal blankets, or embedded External Tank foam that did not cause damage to the TPS tiles or blankets).<\/p>\n
\u201cImagery review complete. External Tank (ET) doors verified closed. DAT unanimously recommends clearing TPS for entry,\u201d note several DAT review presentations available for download on L2.<\/p>\n
In all, the 14 areas of damage or softgoods included: eight gap filler\/thermal barrier protrusions, 10 tile anomalies located in six clusters on Right Hand chine, two lower surface protrusions, and one area of embedded ET foam.<\/p>\n
For Endeavour\u2019s OMS (Orbital Maneuvering System) Pods, only the Port-side Pod gained any attention from the DAT.<\/p>\n
![\"E5\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E52.jpg\" "\\"E5\\"")
Two gap fillers were noted to be protruding (4.1\u201d x 0.38\u201d and 4.2\u201d x 0.25\u201d) from the Port-side Pod as well as one lifted Leading Edge Blanket (1.1\u201d x 0.2\u201d).<\/p>\nGap filler \u201cProtrusion localized to outer layer of sleeving. Bond integrity of gap fillers remains intact,\u201d notes the DAT assessment.<\/p>\n
Similarly, the DAT presentations note that the protruding Thermal Blanket is still bonded to its surrounding tiles and is of no concern for liberation during entry as \u201cAscent flight loads bounds entry\u201d \u2013 mean that this area of the vehicle experiences more aerodynamic loads during ascent than it does during entry.<\/p>\n
All analyses and assessments of the OMS Pods were conducted via the hand-held camera images taken by Endeavour\u2019s Flight Crew from the aft Flight Deck of the Orbiter.<\/p>\n
The next minor area of interest to gain note in the DAT summaries relates to two areas near the Forward Reaction Control System (FRCS) pod.<\/p>\n
![\"E6\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E6.jpg\" "\\"E6\\"")
\u201cFabric protrusion at tile to blanket interface (2.0\u201d x 0.47\u201d x 0.4\u201d),\u201d notes the presentation.<\/p>\nThe area only contains a fabric fray and all insulation qualities around the area are not affected. Likewise, there are no heating or structural concerns should this area of fabric liberate during entry.<\/p>\n
The other area near the FRCS pod is a protruding Thermal Barrier fabric that is lifted by approximately 0.55\u201d at its maximum height.<\/p>\n
As with the frayed fabric, this area poses not concerns for abnormal heating, nor does it pose a risk of liberating during entry.<\/p>\n
Transitioning to the underside of the Endeavour, the DAT assessment notes only nine areas of damage or softgoods \u2013 six damage sites on the Right Hand Chine, two softgoods on or near the Nose Land Gear Door (NLGD), and one softgood on the Left Hand outboard elevon.<\/p>\n
On the elevon, \u201c0.25\u201d +\/- 0.15\u201d pillow gap filler protrusion noted on the port outboard elevon edge.\u201d<\/p>\n
![\"E8\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E8.jpg\" "\\"E8\\"")
The gap filler, however, is still providing \u201csidewall compression\u201d on the surrounding tiles. Therefore, there is sufficient bond area remaining to preclude the possibility of liberation during entry.<\/p>\nFurthermore, as the elevon is at the aft end of the vehicle, there will not (nor could there be) any downstream affects on Endeavour.<\/p>\n
The two remaining softgoods on the underside of Endeavour are toward the front of the vehicle.<\/p>\n
The first of these remaining softgoods is located on the NLGD door.<\/p>\n
\u201cDebris was identified on NLGD centerline,\u201d notes a DAT presentation. The debris, which can clearly be seen on the RPM photographs, is most likely a piece of ET foam which liberated from the External Tank during ascent and became wedged between the two NLGDs.<\/p>\n
The identification of the wedged debris is based on the debris\u2019 color, location, and potential transport paths during ascent. With all those factors, the DAT has concluded that this is, in fact, a piece of ET foam.<\/p>\n
![\"E7\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E7.jpg\" "\\"E7\\"")
Nevertheless, since the Thermal Barrier cords that seal the two NLGDs together for entry (as well as the adjacent TPS tiles) are undamaged and intact, there is no entry or heating concerns regarding the wedged piece of foam.<\/p>\nThe final softgood area on Endeavour is a protruding TPS blanket at the Arrowhead (the place on the underside of the Orbiter where the forward attachment strut for the External Tank is bolted to the vehicle).<\/p>\n
The presentation notes that there is a \u201c0.32\u201d +\/- 0.15\u201d protrusion of arrowhead blanket sleeving at the 6 o\u2019clock position.\u201d<\/p>\n
This protrusion is expected to transition the Boundary Layer at Mach 18.7, creating an early transitional area of influence on the downstream protruding gap filler on the Left Hand outboard elevon.<\/p>\n
However, thermal limits and constraints will not be violated by the transition. Thus, this area is of no concern for entry.<\/p>\n
![\"E9\"](\"https:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2009\/07\/E9.jpg\" "\\"E9\\"")
Finally, the DAT presentation notes the six distinct TPS tile damage sites on the Right Hand chine area of Endeavour.<\/p>\nOf these six damage sites, a total of 10 TPS tiles are damaged with a maximum damage depth observed at 0.35\u201d \u2013 well within the thermal and structural capabilities of the underbelly TPS tiles.<\/p>\n
In the end, all the TPS chine damage areas were cleared by comparing the specific damage locations and depths with previous analyses, flight histories, and certified analytical tools.
\nSee also:<\/p>\nSTS-125 DAT Overview Article:
\nhttp:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/2009\/05\/sts-125-eva-4-stis-repair-atlantis-tps-overview\/
\nSTS-126 DAT Overview Article:
\nhttp:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/2008\/11\/dat-role-endeavour-tps-safe-return\/
\nSTS-124 DAT Overview Article:
\nhttp:\/\/www.nasaspaceflight.com\/2008\/06\/sts-124-lon-rescue-stand-down-aided-by-dat-excellence\/<\/p>\nFurther updates will follow. Refer to live update pages \u2013 linked above \u2013 for up-to-the-second live coverage.<\/p>\n
L2 members<\/em><\/em>: Documentation \u2013 from which the above article has quoted snippets \u2013 is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Astronauts Dave Wolf and Chris Cassidy have returned to the Quest airlock earlier than scheduled, due to concerns relating to a potentially faulty LiOH canister in Cassidy\u2019s suit during STS-127\u2019s third EVA. Meanwhile, the full findings of the Damage Assessment Team (DAT) have been produced via a series of stunning presentations, confirming Endeavour is an […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-41043","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41043"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=41043"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41043\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=41043"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=41043"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=41043"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}