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<\/p>\n **L2 STS-115 Coverage: L-2 and L-1 MMT Notes. ALL related handbooks, from Final Flight Plan to EVA Presentations (550mb of 115 presentations downloadable)**.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/font> <\/em>Update: 22 PDFs from Wednesday\u2019s MMT available to download on L2. Full MMT overview following the conclusion of last night\u2019s meeting also available. UPDATE: 32 more presentations for today\u2019s MMT now available, plus 10 new images of FC1, plus the \u2018engineering-ly brilliant\u2019 e-mail from STS-93 EGIL Tim North and OVERVIEW FOR MMT.<\/font> Main Article<\/u><\/em><\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Yesterday\u2019s meetings were a fascinating insight into the \u2018open forum\u2019 NASA and its contractors now appear to have, with every single department and manager, from NASA administrator Mike Griffin, down to contractor level, being able to give their input on the correct approach to either flying \u2018as-is\u2019 or replacing the Fuel Cell (FC).<\/p>\n **Click the image to view the video of STS-93\u2019s launch \u2013 including transcript of the Air-to-Ground loop (free to view for forum members)**<\/em><\/p>\n However, this launch also saw what is being called a related event with the Fuel Cell, noted as \u2018At approximately 5 seconds into the launch of STS-93, a momentary short occurred on AC1 phase A.\u2019<\/p>\n This made up the basis of the key question that was polled to all managers at the MMT, worded: \u2018Question \u2013 STS-93 event and this event are related in some respects. The Fuel Cell was cleared, but did we have some reverse voltage into the pump that is now manifesting itself. <\/p>\n \u201921 hrs of ATP for other work, but no dielectric test since 1981 delivery. Was the 1970\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s manufacturing with thinner coating that between the 93 short and lightning strike degraded to the point that caused the short we saw now?\u2019<\/p>\n One document (of over 20) acquired by NASASpaceflight.com shows all the poll answers that came back to that question, showing a broad range of opinion throughout the agency on whether to go launch, or stand-down and replace the Fuel Cell.<\/p>\n <\/font><\/p>\n A selection of answers follow:<\/u><\/em><\/font><\/p>\n \u2018OPO \u2013 This morning position was that it would be prudent to change the fuel cell out given the lack of data on collateral damage and uncertainties. But now some more data can be collected on damage to motor and harness before tonight\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s tanking meeting. Still not seeing a common cause safety of flight issue, just mission success. There is rational here to go fly.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018JSC Engineering \u2013 Trying to generate flight rationale by isolating any future shorts on Phase A by pulling cb. Also if can isolate shorts on Phase B & C to ensure fuel cell and SSME controller health. Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t have a good story on the STS-93, and subsequent work to feel you have isolated it to the phase. No GO from engineering point of view. From a program point of view want this crew to perform the mission than do MDF and have the station stage perform the EVAs. Should R&R the FC, and trade the risk of night launch.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018MOD \u2013 Open questions of propagation of the short to phase B & C and is this potentially common cause. Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t see we have the flight rational to be go for launch. Need positive rule out propagation and common cause before can be go for launch.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Flight Ops Integration \u2013 think common cause is unlikely based on fuel cell performance. Haven\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t seen the two phase pump under ascent or zero-g environment. Rather trade risk of fly as is vs R&R to get off the ground in Oct. Stand down and fix it, then challenge the night launch rules.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Flight launch manager \u2013 agrees with Flight Ops & Int SE&I \u2013 is the risk increased? Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t know because they don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t know what the failure is yet. Maybe wire harness, maybe in the pump, maybe due to lightning, maybe not aging issue. Probably not safety of flight concern, even though SSME shutdown is handle. Launching doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t get as many points as assembling the mission does. Starting off with a failure, not how we want to be. Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t feel we have flight rationale data, can go into tanking to wait for data. Need to see that data before go for launch Thursday or Friday. Is this isolated to phase A or something from STS-93. squeeze data out to get flight rationale, but not there yet.<\/font><\/p>\n NASA mission patches (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});<\/p>\n \u2018Flight Crew Ops \u2013 haven\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t heard enough to be safe to go fly, but could get there. Want to hear about physical damage, (burned wires, arc tracking). If we lose 2nd phase what happens, what is the signature. Take time to get more data. Willing to trade MDF, R&R, night launch.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Range \u2013 based on ELV experience, need some more time to figure out the unknowns. <\/p>\n \u2018ISS \u2013 if you believe reasonable chance of not launching into MDF then get the hardware to orbit. Been a lot of talk that this wont affect the other phases, but if you get comfortable with the isolation then take the risk to launch. Hardware on the ground doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t do much for us, and willing to take risk of MDF. Tanking meeting good point to decide if have enough data to be go.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018USA \u2013 not pessimistic as some as common cause. Probably good explanation that it happened this time and after such a long down time on this fuel cell. Is a programmatic risk discussion. Ascent increase in risk to additional phase problems. There is no impact only if engine redundancy is effected. Orbit don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t think there is increase in risk. The longer the fuel cell is running, the more confident you become in fuel cell performance. Proceed to tanking with intention of launching tomorrow unless eureka data points out something.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Lockheed Martin \u2013 opportunity to launch, but common cause and root cause data should be gotten. Look through fault tree with probabilities of risk.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018ET \u2013 still concern with phase B & C. may not have enough data that it will be isolated even tomorrow. Can you programmatically clear the tower with 2 fuel cells. Do you do whole mission or MDF.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Poulos \u2013 nothing we are going to do to identify root cause until R&R, assume FC1 short out at tower clear. Do you do the mission on the 2 fuel cells.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018ATK \u2013 seems like understanding cause or consequence which you can get comfortable to go fly. On the consequence side.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018RSRM \u2013 what we know or don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t know and what is positive or negatives. Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t have enough positives to quantify a go. Another 24 hours might find with vendor, drawings etc to preserve launch.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018SRB \u2013 if this failure doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t lead us to effect main buses then SRB is fine. Data set is imperfect and doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t seem to meet standards of rational. People struggling with the fact the fault tree isn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t shaking out a probable cause. STS-93 might give us some history or cause. Consequence side is not as crisp as needs to be. What are the level of redundancy, performance margin (3 sigma, ICD). Not now but maybe tonight or 24 hours to crisp rational up. If this could be common cause, we need to exonerate the other fuel cells. Pile of imperfect data that could be woven into rational.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018SSME \u2013 assess common cause or collateral damage. Assuming pump operates without issue on two phases. If we lose fuel cell and safe engine shutdown. STS-93 scenario demonstrated risk and capability. Pump appears operating nominally. Bring more data to tanking meeting. If history shows no collateral damage and not indict the other phases of this pump.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018MSFC Engineering \u2013 don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t have anything to cling to that this is stable, this is okay. Keep working, keep supporting and get more data.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Deputy MSFC \u2013 rational is pretty weak if you look just at fuel cell. How much more load is going to be put on unit. But from programmatic view, it is what it is. Accept risk from <\/font>SSME and orbit has options. Be in the probably alright mode, given more time orbiter could get more data. R&R vs daylight launch. Give Orbiter 24 more hours.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Shuttle Processing \u2013 program management can accept risk of MDF and fly with cb out. Wavering on where the failure is (in pump, in harness). More time to look at data on STS-93, vendor insight, wire harness, energy absorption. Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t work the team to get data or launch. If there is a reasonable chance of not launching into MDF, then give team rest and launch tomorrow. Spend 24 hours getting more data.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018SM&A \u2013 thinks this is a safety issue since cant rule out common cause or root cause. Just because hasn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t happened before doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t mean could be common cause (APU issue from STS-79). Usually don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t fly with unknown conditions. Risk trade of manifest if R&R vs MDF risk. Have 3 weeks of manifest margin, where as MDF gets us into posture of needing another mission possibly. PAD abort gets us into SSME units availability. Safest and best thing to do is to R&R.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Shannon \u2013 have shown this is not a crew safety issue. Sufficient redundancy in fuel cell to get to orbit. Potentially drop controllers offline, but not an abort. Program needs to weigh if can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t complete mission or push to stage. Team needs to keep working. The programmatic risk of delay is not worth it for this issue. Negative reporting basis into tanking meeting. If pump is still performing well then go for launch.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Vendor \u2013 looked at past performance data from 3 years ago. Don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t know what happened since then to pump, to harness. Not comfortable with the fuel cell.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018LeRoy (Cain) \u2013 no violation of LCC, launching with full SSME controllers. Risks to transients on Phase B & C is incremental increase. Program risk not safety of flight risk. No impact to mission for loss of single phase. Fuel cell performance has been very good since start up. Flying with phase A cb open makes sense. Risk to R&R at the PAD is unknown and a concern. Should be mindful of vertical R&R. Rolling back is even more risk to both programs because of the October launch. Can fly safe and not get much more data anytime soon. We have never had perfect data. Continue with the launch countdown with a T-0 on Thursday. If we get negative data to consider common cause then we will talk about not launching.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Crew \u2013 full confidence in the team to make the right decision. Going to sleep expecting to launch. Thanks to the team for the work they have done on lighting strike and this issue. <\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Wayne Hale \u2013 Decided to take a day to look at the data to review that there isn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t an issue with other fuel cells. Hate to waste a good weather day, but its wise to take the time to review the data.<\/font><\/p>\n (Bill) Gerst \u2013 pushing a little too hard and need to take the day to look at the data some more.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018Griffin \u2013 suspicious of coincidence. Not put enough emphasis of this unit on the same phase had issue previously. Phase might be no good, but may be no impact to phase B & C and thus go for launch. Opportunity to look at the data and say yes Phase A sucks, but the other two are fine.\u2019<\/p>\n Back-up plans are already in place, ranging from a mission duration reduction to seven days \u2013 likely to be in a scenario where one FC fails during the mission, and \u2013 as exclusively reported by NASASpaceflight \u2013 launching on Saturday, to allow more time to evaluate data, should today\u2019s meetings fail to find a conclusive answer to the FC question. Saturday\u2019s launch attempt is now officially listed on NASA documentation as an option.<\/p>\n The Seven Day mission profile would run as follows: \u2018<\/b>STS-115 Minimum Duration Flight: <\/font>FD-1 Launch. FD-2 RCC inspection. FD-3 RNDZ with ISS, P3\/P4 unberth\/Handoff. FD-4 P3\/P4 Install, EVA-1 connect umbilicals for survival power. FD-5 transfer mandatory\/critical items. FD-6 undock, stow, FCS C\/O and RCS Hot Fire. FD-7 Deorbit.\u2019<\/font><\/font><\/p>\n Today, like yesterday, will prove once again to be a fascinating insight into how NASA approach such issues, as they attempt to Return To Assembly.<\/p>\n **DETERMINED STS-115 MUSIC VIDEO**<\/em> \u2013 <\/em><\/font> **NASASpaceflight.com Job Opportunities**<\/font> <\/font><\/em><\/p>\n <\/u><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Meetings have already begun \u2013 as early as 5am Central time \u2013 to build a rationale to present to the midday Management Mission Team (MMT), in the hope that Shuttle Atlantis will be cleared to fly on Friday. NASA is looking at data from the infamous STS-93 launch, which is believed to show data that […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-41951","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41951"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=41951"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41951\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=41951"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=41951"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=41951"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}<\/em><\/font><\/font><\/p>\n
<\/font>**STS-115: MMT Troubleshooting Update Page**<\/font> \u2013 One stop LIVE updates.<\/font>
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KEY EVENTS: (Colour code: Red \u2018No Go\u2019<\/font> \u2013 Green: \u2018Go\u2019<\/font><\/font><\/font>)<\/font>
External Tank Weather<\/font> <\/font>Orbiter <\/font><\/em><\/font><\/font>Range.<\/p>\n
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Key Points\/Newsflashes: Meetings taking place (Central Time): Decision pending. Early source information favouring GO for launch.<\/p>\nColumbia\u2019s launch on STS-93 was a multi-event launch, with the loss of engine controllers on two different engines due to a short circuit \u2013 one failure away from losing either of those engines. This flight also that had a slightly early Main Engine Cut Off (MECO) due to a fuel leak.<\/p>\n
Other options include the possibility of replacing the FC at the pad, dropping lighting requirements, and allowing for a launch in a window that opens on September 24, as favoured by a number of managers who wish to see the FC replaced. (New manifest for a slip to Sept. 24 on L2).<\/p>\n
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<\/em><\/font>LIVE UPDATE PAGES<\/em><\/font><\/p>\n