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<\/font><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Information collated from several documents available to download on L2. \u2018The TPS putty repair issue is similar to the IFR and is still coming together. Putty repairs have been lost in flight, including on 121. Debris transport can cause some of these to impact critical RCC panels and tiles under some conditions. <\/p>\n \u2018Orbiter is bringing the latest status on the OV-104 Ku band attach bolts to Monday\u2019s noon board. The goal is to get into the payload bay on the pad to inspect and confirm sufficient threads are engaged.\u2019 (Attach bolts status will be updated). Aug 15 update 8am Eastern: \u201cThe major unresolved discussion point going into the FRR will be KU-Band thread engagement.\u201d <\/em><\/p>\n The Ice Frost ramps proved to be a key issue ahead of July\u2019s launch of Shuttle Discovery on STS-121, with NASA Safety and NASA Engineering both noting their concerns, later to be diluted by their understanding that the risk was not associated with the crew, given the \u2018safe haven\u2019 ability for the mission.<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018EA does not concur with describing the debris risk from Ice Frost Ramps as Infrequent\/Catastrophic. For the following reasons EA considers the risk Probable\/Catastrophic. The risk assessment masses of 0.08 lbm and 0.25 lbm are several times larger than the orbiter tile impact and damage capability. <\/font><\/p>\n \u20181: Ground testing, ET-120 dissection, and stress analyses have all confirmed the constant, repeatable occurrence of the failure mechanism.<\/p>\n \u20182: Flight history confirms that releases occur every flight and includes masses up to the maximum risk assessment mass. STS-121 had two IFR releases larger than 2 sigma.<\/p>\n \u20183: The release mechanism is not well understood which means time of release cannot be assured. <\/p>\n \u20184: There are no controls in place since the failure is a design flaw.<\/p>\n \u20185: STS-121 cable tray instrumentation results indicate that the flight environment was adequately enveloped by the design environment, reducing the concern of making too many OML changes at once.<\/p>\n \u20186: Risk Assessment indices indicate a high probably (~ 1\/100) of exceeding tile capability which depends on repair capability to not be catastrophic.\u2019<\/p>\n STS-121\u2019s clean flight is likely to help the evaluations of the FRR when it comes to the risks associated. However, an extra equation to add to the mix is STS-115\u2019s High Q ascent profile, which is required for Atlantis\u2019 ability to lift the heavy truss segment payload uphill. Discovery flew a Low Q ascent profile to reduce stresses on the modified External Tank. \u2013 **Low\/High Q article**<\/p>\n Regardless, following on from presentations from the MOD FRR associated with STS-115, the meeting in Florida should pass without any major standouts, with managers then being allowed to fully focus on trying to keep STS-116 (with Discovery) on track for a December launch \u2013 currently under threat. \u2013 **STS-116 Launch date threat article**<\/font><\/p>\n \u2018We\u2019re still on track for launch August 27 (for STS-115),\u2019 noted Hill. \u2018We follow STS-115 right away with STS-117 FOR as the 116 team is simming and preparing to fly in December. <\/p>\n \u2018This is going to be a busy and fun Fall.\u2019<\/p>\n <\/p>\n **NASASpaceflight.com Job Opportunities**<\/em><\/font> <\/u><\/p>\n <\/em><\/font><\/p>\n <\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Three \u201csignificant open items\u201d will be at the center of tomorrow\u2019s STS-115 Flight Readiness Review (FRR), as NASA look to give final approval for the August 27 launch of Shuttle Atlantis. TPS (Thermal Protection System) putty repair risk, issues with the Ku band attach bolts and Ice Frost Ramp risk acceptance \u2013 the latter already […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-41976","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41976"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=41976"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41976\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=41976"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=41976"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=41976"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}<\/em><\/font><\/font><\/font><\/p>\n
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\u2018The most significant open items for 115 are the Ice Frost Ramp risk acceptance, TPS putty repair risk and the OV-104 Ku band attach bolts,\u2019 said Hill in a pre-FRR memo acquired by this site. \u2018The IFR discussion is pretty much the same debate as 121\u2019s. <\/p>\n<\/font>It appears NASA is wanting to reduce the rating on the risk matrix to \u2018Infrequent\/Catastrophic\u2019 \u2013 however, in documents dated August 11, NASA Engineering stated their self titled dissenting opinion, noting they feel the risk should remain as \u2018Probable\/Catastrophic.\u2019<\/p>\n
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<\/em><\/font>LIVE UPDATE PAGES<\/em><\/font><\/p>\n