{"id":43227,"date":"2026-05-28T22:37:44","date_gmt":"2026-05-28T14:37:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp-productionenv-bjg9h2g2bgg5b8aa.southeastasia-01.azurewebsites.net\/news\/mystery-gps-jammer-in-iran-becomes-test-for-nasa-satellites-capabilities\/"},"modified":"2026-05-28T22:37:44","modified_gmt":"2026-05-28T14:37:44","slug":"mystery-gps-jammer-in-iran-becomes-test-for-nasa-satellites-capabilities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/news\/mystery-gps-jammer-in-iran-becomes-test-for-nasa-satellites-capabilities\/","title":{"rendered":"Mystery GPS jammer in Iran becomes test for NASA satellites\u2019 capabilities"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>NASA satellites designed to observe cyclone wind speeds and collapsing ice sheets have also proven capable of identifying the approximate locations of GPS jammers. That could help monitor high-risk areas for aircraft and ships navigating the growing prevalence of GPS interference worldwide.<\/p>\n<p style=\"\">Two different NASA satellite systems showed how they could locate a known but mysterious GPS jammer within several kilometers of its position in Iran, according to an experiment by Sean Gorman, CEO and cofounder of the location-based technology company Zephr.xyz&nbsp;that was detailed in the magazine GPS World. Such jammers use strong signals to overpower the weaker radio signals coming from US-operated GPS satellites and other global navigation satellite systems.<\/p>\n<p>Such NASA satellites cannot perform \u201cnear-real time monitoring\u201d or pinpoint the exact location of GPS jammers, said Clara Chew, principal scientist and lead of the GNSS systems and data team at the California-based satellite manufacturer Muon Space, who was not involved in the study. But Chew told Ars that identifying the approximate locations of GPS jammers \u201ccould potentially be helpful for flight planning\u201d or for \u201cindicating high risk areas for maritime shipping.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>One of the NASA satellite systems, the Cyclone Global Navigation Satellite System (CYGNSS), has eight microsatellites that detect GPS signals reflected from ocean surfaces to measure wind speeds within the eyewalls of hurricanes, tropical cyclones, and typhoons. When an Earth-based jammer turns on, the effect creates a huge footprint in the reflected GPS signals that can show up hundreds of kilometers from the jammer\u2019s location.<\/p>\n<p>The other satellite system, NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR), typically uses radar imaging to continually map and track changes across the Earth\u2019s surface, including earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, and ice sheet collapses. GPS jammer emissions create streaks in the NISAR radar imagery that run perpendicular to flight direction\u2014meaning that \u201ceach streak encodes the jammer\u2019s direction relative to the satellite\u2019s ground track,\u201d Gorman wrote in his GPS World article.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cCYGNSS sees the jammer\u2019s effect on reflected GPS signals, offering an indirect measurement spread across hundreds of specular reflection points,\u201d Gorman wrote. \u201cNISAR sees the jammer\u2019s emissions directly in its own receiver, which is a more precise measurement, but only along the satellite\u2019s narrow ground track.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>,<\/p>\n<h2>Comparing satellite systems<\/h2>\n<p>To validate the NASA satellite systems\u2019 performances using a known jammer location, Gorman and colleagues first used \u201cindependent signals intelligence\u201d to identify and locate a GPS jammer operating near the city of Shiraz in Iran. This mystery jammer has been active since the start of 2026 and has continued operating at even higher power since the war began with the US and Israel attacking Iran on February 28, 2026.<\/p>\n<p>The researchers then ran a controlled experiment that looked at the NASA satellite data during two \u201cjammer on\u201d dates from January 8 and January 20, 2026, along with two \u201cjammer off\u201d dates from December 15 and December 27, 2025. They applied several detection and signal analysis techniques to both the CYGNSS and NISAR data in order to come up with the best approximations for the GPS jammer\u2019s location.<\/p>\n<p>The experiment showed that CYGNSS located the jammer within 4.33 kilometers of the ground truth, with a circular error probable of 3.48 kilometers. The latter means 50 percent of the estimates from repeated analyses on many similar jammers would fall within 3.48 kilometers.<\/p>\n<p>By comparison, NISAR located the jammer to within 6.26 kilometers of the ground truth while demonstrating a circular error probable of 6.88 kilometers. So CYGNSS came out on top.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"ars-wp-img-shortcode id-2156656 align-none\">\n<p>              <img width=\"640\" height=\"360\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-640x360.jpg\" class=\"none medium\" alt=\"Still image showing NISAR\u2019s orbit and ground swath (in orange), alongside the rest of NASA\u2019s Earth-observing satellite fleet such as the CYGNSS micro-satellites (in cyan).\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-640x360.jpg 640w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-768x432.jpg 768w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-1536x864.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-2048x1152.jpg 2048w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-384x216.jpg 384w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-1152x648.jpg 1152w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-980x551.jpg 980w, https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/nisar-and-cygnss-orbits-1440x810.jpg 1440w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px\"><\/p>\n<p>              Still image showing NISAR\u2019s orbit and ground swath (in orange), alongside the rest of NASA\u2019s Earth-observing satellite fleet, such as the CYGNSS micro-satellites (in cyan).<\/p>\n<p>                  Credit:<br \/>\n                                      Kel Elkins | NASA<\/p>\n<\/figure>\n<p>Gorman and colleagues also attempted to combine \u201cCYGNSS\u2019s wide-area sensitivity with NISAR\u2019s geometric precision\u201d in a fused approach. That fused result located the jammer to within 4.69 kilometers with a circular error probable of 7.85 kilometers, which fell short of the standalone CYGNSS result but still showed how \u201ctwo independent physics arriving at similar locations builds confidence that neither sensor is producing an artifact,\u201d Gorman wrote.<\/p>\n<p>It is unusual to see worse performance with the fused approach compared to using CYGNSS alone, said Todd Humphreys, director of the Wireless Networking and Communications Group and the Radionavigation Laboratory at The University of Texas at Austin, in correspondence with Ars. But he said that can happen when calculating the circular error probable based on real-world error data\u2014and he praised the overall work for achieving \u201csuch accurate results\u201d using publicly available satellite data.<\/p>\n<p>,<\/p>\n<p>The demonstration built on earlier research by Chew and colleagues that used CYGNSS data to map regions rife with GPS interference and identify possible jamming sources. \u201cMy work didn\u2019t try to geolocate jammers like Gorman\u2019s does\u2014I was simply gridding the noise variable to 9 km and associating \u2018hot spots\u2019 with known conflict areas around the world,\u201d Chew explained.<\/p>\n<h2>Keeping tabs on GPS jamming<\/h2>\n<p>Such NASA satellites cannot provide \u201cnear-realtime monitoring of GPS jammers\u201d because it can take up to several days for collected data to become publicly available, Chew said. She would be \u201csurprised\u201d if this could deliver very precise geolocation of jammers, but still expressed interest in seeing such methods repeated on other known jammers to measure how consistently they can get within five kilometers of actual locations.<\/p>\n<p>Harnessing this capability from NASA satellite data could allow researchers to better filter out interference from GPS jammers that may impact NASA science missions, Chew said. But she also highlighted the potential usefulness for supporting aviation and maritime navigation warnings, along with aiding open source intelligence investigators who track GPS interference across the world.<\/p>\n<p>Navigation interference resulting from GPS jamming has spread well beyond major conflict zones in Ukraine and the Middle East to impact shipping in the Baltic Sea and Mediterranean, along with maritime traffic in the South China Sea. About 900 flights experience GPS disruptions daily, with degraded GPS service affecting a dozen or so transatlantic flights. Given this unwelcome trend, there is growing interest in a wide variety of GPS alternatives.<\/p>\n<p>When the US military launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran, more than 1,100 ships experienced GPS interference across the Persian Gulf between February 28 and March 1, 2026. Much of the contested Strait of Hormuz is still experiencing GPS jamming and spoofing, with the latter involving false signals that trick GPS receivers into reporting inaccurate positions.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, NASA\u2019s CYGNSS satellite data shows the mystery jammer is operating at \u201cdramatically higher power\u201d with a fivefold increase in signal intensity since the start of the Middle East conflict. Possible explanations include the jammer operator increasing power output to ward off potential US or Israeli military strikes using GPS-guided weapons, more jammers becoming active in the area, or a shift from intermittent to continuous operations, Gorman said. In any case, the NASA satellites\u2019 passive, persistent monitoring capabilities may serve well in letting us know what happens next.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>NASA satellites designed to observe cyclone wind speeds and collapsing ice sheets have also proven capable of identifying the approximate locations of GPS jammers. That could help monitor high-risk areas for aircraft and ships navigating the growing prevalence of GPS interference worldwide. Two different NASA satellite systems showed how they could locate a known but [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":43230,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-43227","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43227"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=43227"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43227\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/43230"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=43227"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=43227"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=43227"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}