{"id":43355,"date":"2026-03-14T22:04:45","date_gmt":"2026-03-14T14:04:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp-productionenv-bjg9h2g2bgg5b8aa.southeastasia-01.azurewebsites.net\/news\/nasa-officials-sidestepped-questions-on-artemis-ii-risks-theres-a-reason-why\/"},"modified":"2026-03-14T22:04:45","modified_gmt":"2026-03-14T14:04:45","slug":"nasa-officials-sidestepped-questions-on-artemis-ii-risks-theres-a-reason-why","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/news\/nasa-officials-sidestepped-questions-on-artemis-ii-risks-theres-a-reason-why\/","title":{"rendered":"NASA officials sidestepped questions on Artemis II risks\u2014there\u2019s a reason why"},"content":{"rendered":"

When talking about risk during a press conference on Thursday, the NASA officials in charge of the upcoming Artemis II Moon mission hedged their answers.<\/p>\n

Reporters\u2019 questions on the risks were certainly valid and appropriate. In an open society, it is vital to set expectations for any hazardous venture such as spaceflight\u2014most importantly for the astronauts actually making the journey, but also for NASA\u2019s workforce, the White House, lawmakers, and members of the public paying for the endeavor.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s more, Artemis II will be the first mission since 1972 to fly humans to the vicinity of the Moon. This is not following the well-trodden yet perilous path that astronauts take to reach the International Space Station, just a few hundred miles above Earth.<\/p>\n

Artemis II will travel more than 1,000 times farther from Earth than the ISS, departing on a trajectory taking the mission several thousand miles beyond the far side of the Moon. The mission will last nine days from liftoff in Florida to splashdown in the Pacific Ocean. The four-person crew will ride a rocket and spacecraft\u2014the Space Launch System and Orion\u2014that have flown together just once before. The sheer novelty of the mission makes it difficult to quantify the risk, NASA officials said Thursday.<\/p>\n

Load and go<\/h2>\n

With just a single data point from flight testing\u2014the unpiloted Artemis I demo mission in 2022\u2014NASA managers were reluctant to publicize the bottom-line number from the probabilistic risk assessment for Artemis II.<\/p>\n

Lori Glaze, NASA\u2019s acting associate administrator for exploration system development, said the agency completed an assessment for Artemis II, but questioned the exercise\u2019s usefulness.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think sometimes we get tricked into believing that those numbers are somehow really telling us something critically important,\u201d Glaze said. \u201cI think they\u2019re valuable. I think we can do things in a relative sense to measure what\u2019s more risky or less risky.\u201d<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

Glaze and other members of the Artemis II management team were speaking with reporters at NASA\u2019s Kennedy Space Center following a flight readiness review. The two-day conclave in Florida provided the forum for a \u201cvery open\u201d and \u201ctransparent\u201d discussion of NASA\u2019s \u201crisk posture\u201d heading into the Artemis II launch, and \u201chow we\u2019re mitigating those risks,\u201d Glaze said.<\/p>\n

The decision-makers present for the meeting unanimously agreed to continue final preparations for the Artemis II mission, now scheduled for liftoff no earlier than April 1 at 6:24 pm EDT (22:24 UTC). \u201cIt is a test flight, and it is not without risk, but our team and our hardware are ready,\u201d Glaze said.<\/p>\n

The four astronauts training to fly on Artemis II joined the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) virtually from their home base in Houston. Their participation included discussion of the Orion spacecraft\u2019s heat shield and reentry trajectory, a topic that prompted additional review from NASA leadership after Jared Isaacman took the helm as the agency\u2019s administrator last year.<\/p>\n

\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Super-telephoto view of the Orion spacecraft\u2019s heat shield tiles.<\/p>\n

Credit:
\n Trevor Mahlmann<\/p>\n<\/figure>\n

\u201cThe question was, \u2018Are we going to be able to hit that entry interface and get them back on Earth safely,\u2019\u201d Glaze said of the crew\u2019s comments during the FRR. \u201cThey were listening to make sure that we have that really nailed down, and we\u2019ll be able to hit that entry interface. Understanding communication challenges and making sure that they\u2019ll be able to maintain communication with Earth. That\u2019s one of the things. They were looking at those risks. The environmental control and life support systems, power systems, things like that, the things that could cause challenges to them while they\u2019re in flight.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Artemis II launch was supposed to take place in early February, but engineers ran into problems with a leaky hydrogen seal in the SLS rocket\u2019s fueling line, followed by an issue loading helium into the rocket\u2019s upper stage. The latter problem forced NASA to return the rocket to the hangar for repairs. It will return to the launch pad next week.<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

Mission managers have opted not to put the rocket through another fueling test. Before rolling the rocket off the launch pad last month, the launch team completed a successful countdown rehearsal that showed fresh hydrogen seals were leak-tight. \u201cAt this point, we\u2019ve demonstrated that the seals that we have are the best seals that we\u2019ve ever seen on the SLS,\u201d Glaze said. \u201cThe next time we tank the vehicle will be when we\u2019re attempting to launch.\u201d<\/p>\n

NASA has six launch opportunities in early April\u2014officials just added April 2 to the list of possible launch dates\u2014or else will have to wait until the end of April for the next series of launch attempts.<\/p>\n

Are the numbers trash?<\/h2>\n

John Honeycutt, chair of the Artemis II mission management team, discussed the mission\u2019s risk uncertainties in an uncharacteristically blunt fashion for a NASA official.<\/p>\n

NASA wants to avoid succumbing to a failure of imagination, a term invoked by astronaut Frank Borman after the fatal fire inside the Apollo 1 spacecraft on its launch pad in 1967. \u201cWe use that term a lot in human spaceflight,\u201d Honeycutt said. \u201cWe want to be sure that we\u2019re thinking about everything that can possibly go wrong, and have we assessed and adjudicated all the risk to put us in the best posture to be successful.\u201d<\/p>\n

So, what is the risk of a catastrophic accident on Artemis II? Honeycutt said NASA has \u201cgrappled\u201d with the risk probability for some time. \u201cWhat I would say is we understand the risk associated with the individual components, the subsystems, and then the overall systems.\u201d<\/p>\n

Statistically, Honeycutt said, about half of all rockets fail on their first flights. This is essentially true, with the global success rate for new types of orbital-class rockets somewhere between 50 and 60 percent over the last decade, depending on what exactly qualifies as a new launch vehicle. The SLS rocket performed marvelously after clearing the launch pad on Artemis I.<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

John Honeycutt, chair of NASA\u2019s Mission Management Team for the Artemis II mission, speaks during a news conference at Kennedy Space Center in Florida on January 16, 2026.<\/p>\n

Credit:
\n Jim Watson\/AFP via Getty Images<\/p>\n<\/figure>\n

Honeycutt, who managed the SLS program before taking over the Artemis mission management team, said he and Glaze want to bring the probability of a failure on an Artemis flight below 1 in 50. Achieving a 2 percent failure rate would assume NASA was \u201creally getting after it and staying on a good cadence,\u201d Honeycutt said. (NASA\u2019s inspector general, in a report released earlier this week, wrote that the agency\u2019s \u201closs of crew threshold\u201d is 1 in 30 for Artemis missions overall. A NASA spokesperson said Thursday the agency would release more context on the risk assessment, but did not provide additional information by press time.)<\/p>\n

The lull between Artemis missions comes with its own risks. Taking so much time\u2014nearly three-and-a-half years\u2014between flights doesn\u2019t improve safety. This is apparent to Isaacman, who announced last month a program shake-up to fly the next mission\u2014Artemis III\u2014next year to low-Earth orbit to demonstrate docking with a commercial lunar lander in low-Earth orbit. Under the previous plan, Artemis III would have gone all the way to the Moon. The audacity of such a mission, wrapping so many untried things into a single flight, meant Artemis III would not have launched for at least two more years, and probably more like three, four, or more.<\/p>\n

Now, Artemis IV is in line to attempt the program\u2019s first human landing at the Moon\u2019s south pole. Isaacman hopes to launch Artemis IV in 2028, but the schedule hinges on near-flawless execution on Artemis II, Artemis III, and speeding up the availability of human-rated Moon landers undergoing development by SpaceX and Blue Origin.<\/p>\n

Long breaks between launches are \u201cnot a recipe for success,\u201d Isaacman said last month. Honeycutt said Artemis II\u2019s risk assessment falls short of the 1-in-50 goal.<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

\u201cOn the second or third time, with this gap that we\u2019ve got, it\u2019s probably not even 1 in 50,\u201d Honeycutt said of Artemis II. \u201cIt\u2019s probably not 1 in 2 \u2026 but it\u2019s probably closer to 1 in 2. That basically means we\u2019re probably not 1 in 50 on the mission exactly like we want it to be, but we\u2019re probably not 1 in 2 like we were on the first flight.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think we\u2019re being really careful not to really lay probabilistic numbers on the table for this mission, just given the small amount of data.\u201d Honeycutt continued with an uninhibited appraisal of NASA\u2019s ability to quantify risk.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s interesting that I didn\u2019t get this question asked of me too much on Artemis I, and I understand why,\u201d he said. \u201cWe\u2019ve got people on the rocket this time, so people go, \u2018Oh, shit\u2019 \u2026 I know we have pursued loss of mission, loss of crew type number assessments, but I\u2019m not sure we understand what they mean, in reality.\u201d<\/p>\n

Honeycutt used the danger of falling foam on the space shuttle as an example. This is what led to the destruction of the space shuttle Columbia<\/em> on reentry in 2003, killing seven astronauts at the end of a research mission in low-Earth orbit. The failure was precipitated by an event during launch 16 days earlier.<\/p>\n

In order to correctly assess the risk of foam loss, NASA would have had to not only calculate the probability of foam falling from the shuttle\u2019s external fuel tank, but also all the other variables that could lead to a catastrophic failure. \u201cIt\u2019s got to be in the right place, and then you\u2019ve got to work the demise chain,\u201d Honeycutt said. \u201cWhat\u2019s it going to hit? What if it does hit that? What can it do? If you work through all that from a technical standpoint, you can put yourself in a better place rather than just solely relying on a probabilistic number.\u201d<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

The loss of mission and loss of crew assessments are not the same. Unlike the shuttle, the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft have a Launch Abort System, giving the astronauts the ability to escape a rocket failure during ascent into space.<\/p>\n

\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The Artemis II crew virtually joined the flight readiness review held at Kennedy Space Center this week.<\/p>\n

Credit:
\n NASA\/Amber Jean Notvest<\/p>\n<\/figure>\n

Facing reality<\/h2>\n

The way NASA is assessing and communicating risk for Artemis II sharply contrasts with how the agency formulated and discussed risk assessments for several recent notable missions.<\/p>\n

On Artemis I, NASA assessed there was a 1-in-125 probability that the Orion spacecraft could be lost in flight, an estimate that far exceeds Honeycutt\u2019s evaluation of statistical risk. Before Artemis I\u2019s launch in 2022, NASA said the probability took into account known failure modes, redundancy in the rocket and the spacecraft, and \u201ccommon cause failures\u201d that might take out multiple systems in flight.<\/p>\n

The top risk for Artemis I was the potential for collisions with small pieces of space junk or tiny naturally occurring fragments of asteroids or comets. The catch-all term for this material is micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD). NASA officials also cited risks with avionics and software on the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft\u2019s heat shield propulsion system.<\/p>\n

Honeycutt and Glaze are not the first NASA officials to question the validity of probabilistic risk assessments, which rely on numerical and statistical inputs, many of which are grounded in assumptions, especially for flights early in a program.<\/p>\n

Bill Gerstenmaier, the former longtime chief of NASA\u2019s human spaceflight programs and now a SpaceX vice president, has cited the agency\u2019s erroneous risk assessment ahead of the first space shuttle flight in 1981. Engineers estimated a 1-in-500 to 1-in-5,000 chance of losing the crew on that mission. In retrospect, the first shuttle flight actually had a 1-in-10 to 1-in-12 chance of killing the crew. The odds of crew loss for each Apollo mission were about the same. By the end of the shuttle program, after two fatal disasters, NASA calculated that the risk of losing the crew on any single mission was about 1 in 90.<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

NASA assessed 1-in-276 odds for loss of crew on the first flight of astronauts aboard SpaceX\u2019s Crew Dragon in 2020. For Boeing\u2019s Starliner in 2024, the probability was 1 in 295. You wouldn\u2019t be wrong to question those numbers given the proven performance of Dragon and Starliner.<\/p>\n

\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

This chart from NASA\u2019s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance describes the agency\u2019s process for conducting probabilistic risk assessments.<\/p>\n

Credit:
\n NASA<\/p>\n<\/figure>\n

So, what do the Artemis II astronauts make of all this?<\/p>\n

The mission\u2019s commander, Reid Wiseman, said the crew members were trying to prepare their families \u201chonestly and openly\u201d for the hazards of a circumlunar flight.<\/p>\n

\u201cI went on a walk with my kids, and I told them, \u2018Here\u2019s where the will is, here\u2019s where the trust documents are, and if anything happens to me, here\u2019s what\u2019s going to happen to you,\u2019\u201d Wiseman said. \u201cThat is a part of this life. I actually wish more people in everyday life talked to their families that way because you never know what the next day is going to bring.\u201d<\/p>\n

Any sailor knows you can\u2019t stay in the harbor forever. Test pilots and astronauts take calculated risks for a living.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen you see numbers like Mach 39 at entry, when you see numbers like 38,000 miles, 250,000 miles, and 5 or 6 million pounds on the pad, those are just insane numbers,\u201d Wiseman said. \u201cThese numbers, you don\u2019t even comprehend. There\u2019s risk in that. We don\u2019t know what we don\u2019t know right now, so we\u2019ll go learn all that [on the mission].<\/p>\n

Despite the unknowns, Wiseman is ready: \u201cFor me, I actually feel completely 100 percent bought in. When I get into Orion, it\u2019s like climbing into my bed, and I\u2019ll feel warm and tucked in.\u201d<\/p>\n

The formal risk matrix for Artemis II is similar to that of Artemis I, with MMOD again at the top of the list. Matt Ramsey, NASA\u2019s Artemis II mission manager, told Ars in January that the Orion spacecraft\u2019s environmental control and life support system, which didn\u2019t fly with its full capability on Artemis I, is the second-highest risk for Artemis II. \u201cThose two are my biggest worries,\u201d said Ramsey, who has been with NASA since 2002.<\/p>\n

,<\/p>\n

Honeycutt, a 36-year NASA veteran, has a different view.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen have the last two events occurred?\u201d Honeycutt said, referring to the root causes of NASA\u2019s Challenger<\/em> and Columbia<\/em> shuttle disasters. \u201cGoing uphill, in that highly energetic event, that\u2019s when it occurred. We can fool ourselves sometimes into thinking, \u2018Really, is that the biggest risk to the mission, MMOD?\u2019<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen we\u2019ve got the most dynamic activities going on, like during ascent, when we\u2019re doing those burns, doing the perigee raise, and then we\u2019re doing the TLI (Trans-Lunar Injection) burn, those are going to be the times that we\u2019re introducing the most risk into the whole mission,\u201d Honeycutt said. \u201cThere\u2019s a lot of time where we\u2019re steady state, and we\u2019re going to be feeling pretty good about what\u2019s going on in the mission.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ramsey\u2019s role as mission manager will transition to Honeycutt two days before launch. The Launch Abort System reduces the risk of a rocket failure harming the crew, Ramsey said. \u201cThat mitigates a lot of the ascent risk,\u201d he said. \u201cCertainly, the entry, descent, landing is risky. You\u2019ve got to get the parachutes out and that sort of thing.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cAt the end of the day, we want to accomplish as many goals as we\u2019ve laid out for ourselves in the mission,\u201d Honeycutt said. \u201cBut the main thing that I want to do is I want to hit that damn entry interface right down the middle and make sure that I\u2019m bringing the crew home safely.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

When talking about risk during a press conference on Thursday, the NASA officials in charge of the upcoming Artemis II Moon mission hedged their answers. Reporters\u2019 questions on the risks were certainly valid and appropriate. In an open society, it is vital to set expectations for any hazardous venture such as spaceflight\u2014most importantly for the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":42812,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-43355","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43355"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=43355"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/43355\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/42812"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=43355"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=43355"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=43355"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}