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Gen. Chance Saltzman, the Space Force\u2019s chief of Space Operations, speaks Tuesday at the Space Force Association\u2019s Spacepower Conference in Orlando, Florida.<\/p>\n
Credit:
\n Space Force Association<\/p>\n<\/figure>\n
This week, Saltzman laid out the military\u2019s view of offensive weapons in space in perhaps the plainest language yet.<\/p>\n
\u201cSpace is a war-fighting domain,\u201d Saltzman said at the Space Force Association\u2019s Spacepower Conference in Orlando, Florida. \u201cTen years ago, I couldn\u2019t say that. That\u2019s the starting point. Think about that. In 2014, we had senior leaders start to talk about space and war in the same sentence. They got kind of berated by the senior leadership. So this is still a relatively new condition when we\u2019re talking about war-fighting in space. I don\u2019t think we should underestimate the power of that.\u201d<\/p>\n
An alert posture<\/h2>\n
Gen. Stephen Whiting, the four-star chief of US Space Command, identified \u201cintegrated space fires\u201d\u2014again, these are actual offensive or defensive attacks against an enemy vehicle\u2014as his organization\u2019s most pressing need. These could be based in any domain\u2014land, air, sea, or space\u2014and aimed against targets within and above the atmosphere.<\/p>\n
So what would these weapons look like? They might be electronic or cyber in nature, allowing US forces to hack a satellite or its ground-based support network. Russia has already done this, when hackers launched a cyberattack on a commercial European satellite communications network in 2022, the same day the country began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n
,<\/p>\n
Then there\u2019s directed energy, which would use a laser beam to blind or dazzle satellite sensors in orbit. Directed energy weapons could be based on the ground or in space. There\u2019s another option that would involve one satellite sidling up next to an adversary\u2019s and using a claw or robotic arm to capture it and take control.<\/p>\n
Finally, there are the kinds of space weapons that can blow a satellite out of the sky. These antisatellite weapons (ASATs) are perhaps the most low-tech solution\u2014the United States, China, Russia, and India have openly demonstrated them\u2014but they come with dangerous side effects.<\/p>\n
For example, a Chinese ASAT missile test in 2007 destroyed one of the country\u2019s own satellites, creating more than 3,000 trackable debris objects in low-Earth orbit, the largest cloud of space debris in history. The United States performed a similar ASAT missile test against a satellite in 1985.<\/p>\n
Destructive ASATs, like directed energy weapons, can be based on the ground or in space. In 2021, Russia launched a ground-based direct-ascent ASAT missile to take out one of its own satellites. The year before, Space Command reported Russia tested a space-based ASAT weapons system in which a Russian military satellite released a projectile moving fast enough to destroy another satellite if it made an impact.<\/p>\n Anti-satellite weapons are nothing new. In this photo from 1994, a woman passes by a huge mural in Tehran, Iran, depicting satellite television networks as satans and enemies of Islam.<\/p>\n Credit: Most recently, news leaked from US government sources in February that Russia is developing a nuclear ASAT weapon. If used, this would render low-Earth orbit, a section of space stretching several hundred miles above Earth, unusable for a year or more, according to John Plumb, the former assistant secretary of defense for space policy.<\/p>\n US officials said Russia hasn\u2019t placed a nuclear weapon in orbit yet, but if it did, the move would violate Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Russia is a party to the treaty, which bans weapons of mass destruction in space. Russia\u2019s representative at the UN Security Council vetoed a resolution in April to reaffirm this tenet of the Outer Space Treaty and instead proposed a resolution to ban all weapons in space, which the United States rejected. After all, US officials say Russia has already tested an ASAT weapon in orbit.<\/p>\n ,<\/p>\n And now, the US Space Force desires space weapons of its own.<\/p>\n \u201cWe need joint all-domain fires to be able to do that, everything from across the gamut of cyber, non-kinetic, kinetic, and those can come from any domain. But we need to have the ability to influence targets, just like every other domain does,\u201d Whiting said.<\/p>\n At the conference Tuesday, Ars asked Saltzman if the Space Force will talk more about the capabilities it is deploying in orbit. Can deterrence work if adversaries don\u2019t know how the Space Force might respond to a threat?<\/p>\n In the film Dr. Strangelove<\/em>, the titular character says that deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear of attacking. At the end of the movie (spoiler alert if you haven\u2019t seen this 60-year-old film), a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union results in the automatic activation of a secret Russian \u201cdoomsday machine\u201d that will destroy all life on Earth.<\/p>\n According to the plot, Russia developed the machine to dissuade a US attack on its territory. Dr. Strangelove, a zany, mercurial military adviser in the film, aptly states: \u201cThe whole point of a doomsday machine is lost if you keep it a secret!\u201d<\/p>\n Saltzman made it clear that the Space Force can\u2019t stop at developing defensive countermeasures against an attack on a US satellite. One of these defensive measures is resiliency, where the Space Force puts up constellations of hundreds or thousands of satellites to provide the surveillance, communication, and missile-tracking functions previously the domain of smaller numbers of billion-dollar satellites\u2014big, juicy targets in the eyes of an enemy in conflict with the United States. The Pentagon is well on the way to deploying these mega-constellations, but military commands caution this is not enough.<\/p>\n \u201cWe have to build capabilities that provide our leadership offensive and defensive options,\u201d he said in response to a question from Ars. \u201cWeapons systems aren\u2019t inherently offensive or defense. Is an aircraft carrier offensive or defense? Yes. Is an F-35 offensive or defense? Yes. So when we get in this fight about whether or not a spacecraft\u2014is this an offensive weapon? No, it\u2019s just a capability.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThen, the operations, as approved by the secretary of defense and the president, will decide the nature of those (capabilities),\u201d Saltzman said. \u201cIt\u2019s our job to make sure that we think through the spectrum of operations, the spectrum of needs that are necessary.\u201d<\/p>\n An operator inside the National Space Defense Center at Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado.<\/p>\n Credit: These wartime scenarios in space range from a one-off cyberattack against a satellite system\u2014like Russia\u2019s move against a Viasat commercial satellite network in 2022\u2014to a destructive nuclear detonation in Earth orbit, something US officials fear Russia might be preparing to do. The Pentagon is also concerned with the ability of potential adversaries, particularly China, to use their satellites to bolster their land, air, and naval forces, similar to the way the US military leans on its space-based capabilities.<\/p>\n ,<\/p>\n One concept proposed by some government and industry officials is to launch roving \u201cdefender\u201d satellites into orbit, with the sole purpose of guarding high-value US satellites against an attack. These wouldn\u2019t be able to effectively defend a spacecraft against a ground-based anti-satellite missile, which can launch without warning. But a space-based attack might involve an enemy satellite taking days or weeks to move close to a US satellite due to limitations in maneuverability and the tyranny of orbital mechanics.<\/p>\n Any defender satellites deployed by the US military would need highly efficient propulsion or have a design that enables refueling in orbit. Tory Bruno, CEO of United Launch Alliance, wrote about the defender concept in a Medium post earlier this month.<\/p>\n Bruno added some context Thursday in a roundtable discussion with reporters, describing the defender concept as \u201ca lightning fast, long-range, lethal, if necessary, vehicle to defend our assets on orbit.\u201d<\/p>\n Essentially, the idea would take something like a space tug or upper stage\u2014an upgraded version of ULA\u2019s own Centaur V upper stage could do the job just fine, Bruno said\u2014and leave it in orbit on alert to respond to any threats against US or allied satellites.<\/p>\n \u201cYou can move one of these vehicles in hours, interdict what might be an attack, and stop the attack,\u201d Bruno said. \u201cSo that becomes a very powerful deterrent because we move from what we are working toward right now, which is \u2018go ahead and attack me and disable several of my satellites, and I can still keep doing my job,\u2019 to a place where you say, \u2018Go ahead and attack. It\u2019s not going to work. You\u2019re not going to be able to disable anything.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n Brig. Gen. Anthony Mastalir, who leads US Space Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, has probably the closest eye on China\u2019s space program of any military commander. His area of responsibility includes the South China Sea, where China has expanded its military footprint and could one day threaten Taiwan, a US ally.<\/p>\n ,<\/p>\n Mastalir said China is \u201ccopying the US playbook\u201d with the way it integrates satellites into more conventional military operations on land, in the air, and at sea. \u201cTheir specific goals are to be able to track and target US high-value assets at the time and place of their choosing,\u201d Mastalir said.<\/p>\n China\u2019s strategy, known as Anti-Access\/Area Denial, or A2AD, is centered on preventing US forces from accessing international waters extending hundreds or thousands of miles from mainland China. Some of the islands occupied by China within the last 15 years are closer to the Philippines, another treaty ally, than to China itself.<\/p>\n The A2AD strategy first \u201cextended to the first island chain (bounded by the Philippines), and now the second island chain (extending to the US territory of Guam), and eventually all the way to the West Coast of California,\u201d Mastalir said.<\/p>\n US officials say China has based anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-ballistic weapons in the region, and many of these systems rely on satellite tracking and targeting. Mastalir said his priority at Indo-Pacific Command, headquartered in Hawaii, is to defend US and allied satellites, or \u201cblue assets,\u201d and challenge \u201cred assets\u201d to break the Chinese military\u2019s \u201clong-range kill chains and protect the joint force from space-enabled attack.\u201d<\/p>\n What this means is the Space Force wants to have the ability to disable or destroy the satellites China would use to provide communication, command, tracking, navigation, or surveillance support during an attack against the US or its allies.<\/p>\n Buildings and structures are seen on October 25, 2022, on an artificial island built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. China has progressively asserted its claim of ownership over disputed islands in the region.<\/p>\n Credit: Mastalir said he believes China\u2019s space-based capabilities are \u201csufficient\u201d to achieve the country\u2019s military ambitions, whatever they are. \u201cThe sophistication of their sensors is certainly continuing to increase\u2014the interconnectedness, the interoperability. They\u2019re a pacing challenge for a reason,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \u201cWe\u2019re seeing all signs point to being able to target US aircraft carriers\u2026 high-value assets in the air like tankers, AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System),\u201d Mastalir said. \u201cThis is a strategy to keep the US from intervening, and that\u2019s what their space architecture is.\u201d<\/p>\n That\u2019s not acceptable to Pentagon officials, so Space Force personnel are now training for orbital warfare. Just don\u2019t expect to know the specifics of any of these weapons systems any time soon.<\/p>\n \u201cThe details of that? No, you\u2019re not going to get that from any war-fighting organization\u2014\u2019let me tell you precisely how I intend to attack an adversary so that they can respond and counter that\u2019\u2014those aren\u2019t discussions we\u2019re going to have,\u201d Saltzman said. \u201cWe\u2019re still going to protect some of those (details), but broadly, from an operational concept, we are going to be ready to contest space.\u201d<\/p>\n The Space Force will likely receive new policy directives after President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. The Trump transition team hasn\u2019t identified any changes coming for the Space Force, but a list of policy proposals known as Project 2025 may offer some clues.<\/p>\n Published by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, Project 2025 calls for the Pentagon to pivot the Space Force from a mostly defensive posture toward offensive weapons systems. Christopher Miller, who served as acting secretary of defense in the first Trump administration, authored the military section of Project 2025.<\/p>\n Miller wrote that the Space Force should \u201creestablish offensive capabilities to guarantee a favorable balance of forces, efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum, and seriously complicate enemy calculations of a successful first strike against US space assets.\u201d<\/p>\n Trump disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign, but since the election, he has nominated several of the policy agenda\u2019s authors and contributors to key administration posts.<\/p>\n Saltzman met with Trump last month while attending a launch of SpaceX\u2019s Starship rocket in Texas, but he said the encounter was incidental. Saltzman was already there for discussions with SpaceX officials, and Trump\u2019s travel plans only became known the day before the launch.<\/p>\n The conversation with Trump at the Starship launch didn\u2019t touch on any policy details, according to Saltzman. He added that the Space Force hasn\u2019t yet had any formal discussions with the Trump transition team.<\/p>\n Regardless of the direction Trump takes with the Space Force, Saltzman said the service is already thinking about what to do to maintain what the Pentagon now calls \u201cspace superiority\u201d\u2014a twist on the term air superiority, which might have seemed equally as fanciful at the dawn of military aviation more than a century ago.<\/p>\n \u201cThat\u2019s the reason we\u2019re the Space Force,\u201d Saltzman said. \u201cSo administration to administration, that\u2019s still going to be true. Now, it\u2019s just about resourcing and the discussions about what we want to do and when we want to do it, and we\u2019re ready to have those discussions.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" ORLANDO, Florida\u2014Earlier this year, officials at US Space Command released a list of priorities and needs, and among the routine recitation of things like cyber defense, communications, and surveillance was a relatively new term: \u201cintegrated space fires.\u201d This is a new phrase in the esoteric terminology the military uses to describe its activities. Essentially, \u201cfires\u201d […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":44557,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6455,257,2118],"class_list":["post-44555","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","tag-chance-saltzman","tag-military-space","tag-us-space-force"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/44555"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=44555"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/44555\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/44557"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=44555"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=44555"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=44555"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cdn.arstechnica.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/GettyImages-95600951.jpg\")
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\n Kaveh Kazemi\/Getty Images<\/p>\n<\/figure>\nKnowing what we have<\/strong><\/h2>\n
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\n US Space Force\/Kathryn Damon<\/p>\n<\/figure>\nThe case of China<\/h2>\n
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\n Ezra Acayan\/Getty Images<\/p>\n<\/figure>\nA new administration<\/strong><\/h2>\n