{"id":45872,"date":"2023-09-26T23:49:37","date_gmt":"2023-09-26T15:49:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp-productionenv-bjg9h2g2bgg5b8aa.southeastasia-01.azurewebsites.net\/news\/space-force-chief-says-commercial-satellites-may-need-defending\/"},"modified":"2023-09-26T23:49:37","modified_gmt":"2023-09-26T15:49:37","slug":"space-force-chief-says-commercial-satellites-may-need-defending","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/news\/space-force-chief-says-commercial-satellites-may-need-defending\/","title":{"rendered":"Space Force chief says commercial satellites may need defending"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Like the US Navy has long protected sea lanes during conflict, the military could be called upon to defend commercial satellites from attack, particularly as the Pentagon relies more on commercial networks for communication and surveillance, the Space Force\u2019s top general said last week.<\/p>\n<p style=\"\">In comments at a conference in Hawaii on September 20, Gen. Chance Saltzman echoed many statements made by military leaders over the last few years: US military space capabilities are under threat from China and Russia, military leaders need more information about what other countries are doing in space, and commercial satellites are playing an ever-larger role in the military\u2019s space programs.<\/p>\n<p>But Saltzman went a little further in his comments when asked about the military\u2019s role in protecting commercial satellites from an attack. The questioner specifically asked how the US military might respond if Russia attacked SpaceX\u2019s Starlink broadband network, which Ukraine widely uses for Internet connectivity&nbsp;in its war with Russia, despite Elon Musk\u2019s refusal to allow Ukraine to employ Starlink services on certain military operations.<\/p>\n<h2>A valid military objective?<\/h2>\n<p>Saltzman didn\u2019t directly address the scenario posed in the question, but he clearly suggested the US military has a responsibility to defend commercial assets in space.<\/p>\n<p>In a modern war, \u201cthere are going to be commercial entities, commercial organizations, commercial capabilities and assets that get caught up in the conflicts,\u201d Saltzman said. \u201cSpace is no different than sea lanes. It\u2019s no different than civilian airliner traffic in Europe right now. The US has a long history of saying we\u2019re going to protect the things that we need to be successful. So it would stand to reason that that same philosophy would extend into space, and I have no reason to believe that that will be different.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>,<\/p>\n<p>A hypothetical military operation to defend a commercial satellite from an adversary\u2019s attack would likely go through US Space Command, a separate entity from the Space Force, which is charged with equipping and outfitting the military\u2019s combatant commands with the people and technology to carry out their missions.<\/p>\n<p>Space Command is currently led by US Army Gen. James Dickinson. In July, Dickinson basically&nbsp;punted on a similar question about defending commercial satellites from a foreign attack.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI do have a mission area protecting and defending, and that\u2019s widely known, assets on orbit,\u201d he replied. \u201cBut to be honest with you, those have to be directed to me by, you know, my boss, and my boss\u2019s boss, eventually if that were to happen.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Saltzman said last week that it would be up to Dickinson\u2019s command, and ultimately civilian leadership, to set the priorities on what commercial capabilities to defend from attack.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe key will be how much capacity do you have to defend, and what are the things that you choose to defend at the highest prioritization,\u201d Saltzman said.<\/p>\n<p>Last October, a deputy director in Russia\u2019s foreign ministry, Konstantin Vorontsov, said the use of Western commercial satellites by Ukraine established \u201can extremely dangerous trend.\u201d While Vorontsov did not specifically name any satellites, he almost certainly was referring to SpaceX\u2019s Starlink satellite constellation, which has been used by Ukrainian soldiers for communications and for tracking Russian troop and tank movements.<\/p>\n<p>The use of civilian satellites for wartime purposes, Vorontsov said, essentially made them military targets. This was also the conclusion of Tara Brown, an officer in the Royal Air Force and a professor at the US Naval War College who specializes in space law.<\/p>\n<p>,<\/p>\n<p>In a paper published by the Lieber Institute at West Point, which focuses on the study of the law of war, Brown wrote last year that nations must be \u201ccognizant of the risk of commercial satellite systems becoming valid military objectives.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In the case of Starlink, which the military has already procured for a range of operational and demonstration objectives, \u201cthe potential military value that Starlink could provide to the United States is indisputable,\u201d Brown wrote.<\/p>\n<p>The Starlink network is owned and managed by SpaceX on a fully commercial basis. SpaceX has also developed a satellite design based on the Starlink platform, which it calls Starshield, for dedicated military missions.<\/p>\n<p>A physical attack against the Starlink network would be a huge challenge for any adversary. SpaceX has more than 4,000 operational Starlink satellites in orbit, and shooting down a handful of Starlink platforms would have a negligible effect on Internet service. An attack on ground support infrastructure used for Starlink, such as SpaceX\u2019s satellite operations center or launch pads, is also seemingly far-fetched.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe Starlink constellation is a valid military objective, but, as for Russia targeting it, a kinetic attack levied against an entire constellation would be of such a scale that it is difficult to imagine the attack would not run afoul of the principle of proportionality,\u201d Brown wrote.<\/p>\n<p>However, the threat of a cyberattack is real. SpaceX and Pentagon officials have said the Starlink network has already faced Russian jamming attempts.<\/p>\n<p>Russia isn\u2019t the only potential threat. China possesses more advanced capabilities in space that could be used to attack US military or commercial satellites, like Starlink, in the event of a future conflict, such as a war over Taiwan (it\u2019s important to point out there\u2019s no love lost between Elon Musk and Taiwan\u2019s leadership).<\/p>\n<p>,<\/p>\n<p>\u201cChinese defense-affiliated researchers have called for the development of vigorous countermeasures, including kinetic countermeasures, for use against Starlink,\u201d Brown wrote. \u201cThe United States military will wish to preserve and protect the utility of Starlink, and avoid a situation in which China employs such a capability.\u201d<\/p>\n<h2>When to buy commercial<\/h2>\n<p>At the same event in Hawaii, Saltzman outlined how the Space Force is revising its commercial space strategy to more clearly delineate what capabilities the military can acquire from commercial companies and which areas should remain under the government\u2019s responsibility.<\/p>\n<p>Commercial space companies are \u201cindispensable partners\u201d for the military, Saltzman said. \u201cI think it\u2019s my job, it\u2019s the Space Force\u2019s job, to kind of set the vision, outline the guidelines, and make sure that we\u2019re all kind of operating from the same vision. Otherwise, it becomes a lot of ad hoc projects and everybody trying to sell things and work together, and it\u2019s a little messier. So I feel like guidance has to\u2026 come from the top to\u2026 organize the effort.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>He said a preliminary draft of the Space Force\u2019s commercial space strategy didn\u2019t go far enough in guiding military decision-makers on where to go with commercial providers and where to keep military capabilities in-house.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAs I was reading through it, I said, \u2018This is not enough,\u2019\u201d Saltzman said. \u201cIt can\u2019t just be a strategy with aspirational platitudes about how we\u2019re going to work together.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI started to ask some questions amongst the staff, like, \u2018What is the appropriate division between those services which commercial industry can provide, and those services which have to be inherently governmental because of the nature of the effort, the nature of the consequences that come with it?\u2019 Quite frankly, there aren\u2019t a lot of easy answers there.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>One example of the latter, he said, was nuclear command and control. \u201cI think there are few people here that would argue that when it comes to \u2026 using communications capabilities to control our nuclear force, you rely on your military to take care of that,\u201d Saltzman said. \u201cThat\u2019s the most assured way to do it, and we do that.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cSo what are the other things that are inherently governmental, that we really need to say this is an organic military responsibility because of how critical it is? We haven\u2019t defined those yet.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Like the US Navy has long protected sea lanes during conflict, the military could be called upon to defend commercial satellites from attack, particularly as the Pentagon relies more on commercial networks for communication and surveillance, the Space Force\u2019s top general said last week. In comments at a conference in Hawaii on September 20, Gen. 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