{"id":47381,"date":"2026-03-12T23:36:24","date_gmt":"2026-03-12T15:36:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp-productionenv-bjg9h2g2bgg5b8aa.southeastasia-01.azurewebsites.net\/news\/to-achieve-space-dominance-the-u-s-must-eliminate-strategic-ambiguity\/"},"modified":"2026-03-12T23:36:24","modified_gmt":"2026-03-12T15:36:24","slug":"to-achieve-space-dominance-the-u-s-must-eliminate-strategic-ambiguity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/news\/to-achieve-space-dominance-the-u-s-must-eliminate-strategic-ambiguity\/","title":{"rendered":"To Achieve Space Dominance, the U.S. Must Eliminate Strategic Ambiguity"},"content":{"rendered":"<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe Space Force was established \u2026 in recognition of one key fact: space is a warfighting domain,\u201d Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, chief of space operations, recently testified. He added that \u201cit is highly likely that satellites will be some of the first casualties of any conflict between the U.S. and China.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>He\u2019s absolutely correct. Beyond kinetic anti-satellite attacks, U.S. satellites face the prospect of electromagnetic interference, collisions, close-proximity manipulation, and other gray-zone actions that can disable or displace critical systems.<\/p>\n<p>These threats aren\u2019t speculative; they\u2019re observable today. Ambiguous satellite maneuvers, unexpected repositioning of high-value assets, and deliberate gray-zone activities are not hypotheticals \u2013 they are routine features of the current space environment. Space is already contested, and in ways that demand more than passive awareness.<\/p>\n<p>Nowhere is this stark reality better articulated than in \u201cContested Space: Ensuring Effective U.S. National Security Space Capabilities in an Increasingly Contested Environment,\u201d edited by defense and intelligence space experts Christopher A. Williams and James J. Frelk.<\/p>\n<p>The book includes chapters on timely national security space topics as well as actionable recommendations for Washington to increase U.S. space dominance in the face of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical space systems.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>Who is Doing What in Space and Why?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>As Saltzman has emphasized, securing the domain and surviving threats are now core missions of the Space Force. In contested space, \u201csecuring the domain\u201d starts with persistent awareness of who is doing what where and, critically, why. It\u2019s more than episodic coverage of an adversary\u2019s activity or forensic reconstruction of something that happened days ago. Rather, securing the domain demands a sustained ability to observe and interpret activity as it unfolds. This is true space domain awareness (SDA) and a nonnegotiable prerequisite for U.S. dominance in space.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cContested Space\u201d cites deterrence as another pillar of dominance: \u201cDeterrence in space must be based on resilience, survivability, denial of benefit, and attribution.\u201d This last piece, \u201cattribution,\u201d means conclusively identifying the actor behind an action and their intent. Since many space activities involve dual-use technologies \u2013 assets that are useful for civil, commercial, and military purposes \u2013 intent can be hard to pin down.<\/p>\n<p>That\u2019s why attribution is too often treated as a policy problem. But in practice, it\u2019s a tempo problem.<\/p>\n<p>If attribution is slow, adversaries learn they can act and reset before their activity is identified. They learn their opponents lack the fidelity to call them out without ambiguity. This ambiguity becomes their sanctuary.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>Why is This Russian Satellite Following Us?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>Russia\u2019s LUCH (OLYMP) satellites exemplify this challenge. The original LUCH (OLYMP), launched in 2014, spent years maneuvering near high-value commercial satellites, particularly those operated by communications giant Intelsat, maintaining uncoordinated formations as close as 10 kilometers.<\/p>\n<p>These prolonged behaviors weren\u2019t acknowledged by Russia and were not benign. They raised alarms across the commercial space community and among allied governments.<\/p>\n<p>A decade later, in August 2024, the original LUCH (OLYMP) closed to within 2 kilometers of Intelsat-37E. LUCH (OLYMP) 2 launched in March 2023 and employed an identical maneuver with Intelsat 1002, coming within 3 kilometers.<\/p>\n<p>These are not fleeting encounters. They are deliberate, prolonged formations that raise the prospect of surveillance, signals collection, or prepositioning for counterspace missions. These actions lie squarely in the gray zone: operationally ambiguous, politically deniable, and technically difficult to characterize without persistent, high-accuracy SDA.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>We Need Better SDA<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>In written testimony to Congress, Gen. Stephen N. Whiting argued that achieving and maintaining space superiority in a contested domain is a core responsibility of U.S. Space Command. As he put it, \u201cThis critical task requires more accurate, robust, resilient, and timely Space Domain Awareness.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cContested Space\u201d extends that declaration by emphasizing that strategic advantage flows from the ability to decide faster and more confidently than the adversary. That doesn\u2019t just mean knowing where hundreds of thousands of space objects are. It means understanding what they\u2019re doing, what they\u2019ve done, and what might happen next.<\/p>\n<p>We\u2019ve seen that when awareness is sustained and responsive, decision-makers can operate with tempo. They can respond to maneuvers within hours \u2013 not days. They can characterize intent, not just location.<\/p>\n<p>When decisions are informed by persistent, real-time, and reliable data, the fog begins to lift. Strategic ambiguity gives way to operational clarity. That\u2019s how you generate decision advantage, by staying inside the adversary\u2019s OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop and forcing them to operate at a tempo they can\u2019t match.<\/p>\n<p>In October of 2024, Intelsat 33E suffered a catastrophic on-orbit anomaly in Geostationary Orbit (GEO). Previous GEO events \u2013 AMC9, TELKOM1, and Intelsat 29E \u2013 produced debris, but IS33E was different. It released hundreds of trackable fragments \u2013 an unprecedented scale of debris for a single satellite in GEO.<\/p>\n<p>Resolving the full scope of the debris field required coordinated multi-site observations, fused tracking data, and days of sustained analysis to confirm object separations and safeguard nearby assets. We knew what was happening. No ambiguity.<\/p>\n<p>And in this case, we confirmed there was no adversary involvement, which is important to know. &nbsp;As \u201cContested Space\u201d says, \u201cIn the absence of verifiable attribution, escalation risks rise.\u201d The ability to maintain persistent, credible observation isn\u2019t academic \u2013 it\u2019s a shield against misjudgment.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>Commercial Innovation and Operational Consequence<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>In \u201cContested Space,\u201d John Paul \u201cJP\u201d Parker examines why commercial innovation often struggles to penetrate the defense acquisition system. Drawing on decades of experience, Parker argues that despite policy rhetoric encouraging commercial integration, many officials remain dependent on cleared defense contractors and wary of nontraditional firms.<\/p>\n<p>That cultural friction has operational consequences. If decision advantage in contested space depends on persistent, real-time space domain awareness, then failing to adopt the fastest and most capable commercial capabilities is not merely a procurement inefficiency \u2014 it is a strategic vulnerability. Eliminating strategic ambiguity requires not only better sensors, but faster integration of the best available tools.<\/p>\n<p>If the next war starts in space, events such as IS33E foreshadow what those opening moments might look like \u2013 and why we must be ready to interpret them before the world reacts.<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cContested Space\u201d chapter by Scott Pace, director of the George Washington University Space Policy Institute, reminds us that international law still governs space, and that escalation control depends on distinguishing hostile intent from incidental behavior.<\/p>\n<p>But that distinction only exists if you can prove it. Norms only stabilize behavior when violations are visible.<\/p>\n<p>Legitimacy restrains escalation only when attribution is credible. In this sense, SDA isn\u2019t just a military tool; it\u2019s a strategic stabilizer. SDA enables both deterrence and diplomacy.<\/p>\n<p>The strategic picture in \u201cContested Space\u201d is clear. Its diagnosis is urgent. What\u2019s needed now is the operational continuity to carry that urgency forward \u2013 through integration, readiness, and persistent awareness.<\/p>\n<p>From the operator\u2019s perspective, contested space is not an emerging condition. It is the daily baseline. The behaviors described in the book \u2013 RPOs (rendezvous and proximity operations), gray-zone activity, capability signaling through maneuver \u2013 aren\u2019t future threats. They\u2019re recent events.<\/p>\n<p>And robust SDA is not an accessory to space power. It is what allows freedom of action to exist at all. So, as the space environment continues to evolve (often in quiet, subtle ways), our ability to detect, interpret, and respond without ambiguity will determine not only what we can do in orbit, but whether we can act at all.<\/p>\n<p>Certainty will be our sanctuary.<\/p>\n<hr>\n<p><em><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft wp-image-402664 size-thumbnail\" src=\"https:\/\/www.satellitetoday.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Clinton-Clark--150x150.jpeg\" alt=\"\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.satellitetoday.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Clinton-Clark--150x150.jpeg 150w, https:\/\/www.satellitetoday.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Clinton-Clark--300x300.jpeg 300w, https:\/\/www.satellitetoday.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Clinton-Clark--640x640.jpeg 640w, https:\/\/www.satellitetoday.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Clinton-Clark-.jpeg 800w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px\">Clinton Clark serves as chief growth officer and vice president of first impressions at ExoAnalytic Solutions, a leader in space domain awareness for defense and commercial organizations. &nbsp;Exo fields the world\u2019s largest commercial telescope network. On March 10, Anduril Industries announced it is acquiring ExoAnalytic Solutions.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u201cThe Space Force was established \u2026 in recognition of one key fact: space is a warfighting domain,\u201d Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, chief of space operations, recently testified. He added that \u201cit is highly likely that satellites will be some of the first casualties of any conflict between the U.S. and China.\u201d He\u2019s absolutely correct. Beyond [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":47384,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-47381","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47381"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=47381"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47381\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/47384"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=47381"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=47381"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/starpath.global\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=47381"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}