The race to return humans to the Moon is not just about planting a flag. At stake is something less visible but far more consequential: who sets the rules, builds the infrastructure, and defines the operating playbook for the next era of space exploration. And the answer could ripple far beyond the Moon, shaping how – and how soon – humans reach Mars.
The treaty baseline and the real contest
The legal foundation is clear. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits any nation from claiming the Moon as sovereign territory. No one can own it by “claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”
But what the treaty does not forbid is being the first to operate in key locations – and that matters.
The first actors on the ground have the power to shape the norms, the habits, and the infrastructure that everyone else would encounter. Ownership may be off the table, but procedures often harden into precedent. That is the real contest.
Competing playbooks: Norms and rule-setting
Two distinct approaches to lunar governance are already taking shape.
On one side are the Artemis Accords – US-led principles for responsible activity on the Moon and beyond. As of July 2025, 56 countries have signed on, committing to transparency, deconfliction, and cooperative use of resources.
On the other side stands the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), spearheaded by China with Russia as a partner. As of April 2025, 17 countries and organizations had signed onto this vision, which imagines an integrated lunar base in the 2030s.
If China lands astronauts first, the ILRS narrative gains momentum. Precedent is powerful: the group that arrives first at priority sites can set its practices as the de facto standard.
Infrastructure and standards: Building the ‘roads and ports’
Standards are not just about diplomacy – they are about hardware. NASA is developing LunaNet, an open, interoperable lunar communications and navigation framework. If American systems are established first, LunaNet becomes the default.
But China has its own vision. The launch of Queqiao-2 in 2024 provided relay services for far-side operations, and a concept for a 30+ satellite lunar communications and navigation constellation could establish an alternative system through the 2030s and 2040s.
Whoever seeds these networks first gains influence over interfaces, spectrum allocations, and logistics economics. In effect, they build the “roads and ports” others must travel.
Scarce real estate: The south pole advantage
The lunar south pole is the prize. Permanently shadowed regions there contain water ice, which was confirmed by NASA’s LCROSS mission in 2009 and subsequent orbital data from other spacecraft such as the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and India’s Chandrayaan-1 satellite. Ice can be converted into drinking water, breathable oxygen, and even rocket fuel.
But the terrain is limited. Only a handful of “peaks of near-eternal light” provide continuous solar power near the potentially ice-rich craters. NASA policy papers and academic research both anticipate congestion and potential conflicts as multiple nations converge on the same small ridges.
Being first matters because it allows operators to establish safe practices in these high-value areas and invite others to work around them.
Science and the far side’s ‘Radio Quiet Zone’
Beyond resources lies science. The Moon’s far side is uniquely shielded from Earth’s radio noise, making it a goldmine for low-frequency astronomy.
International bodies have stressed the need to protect this natural asset. But protection depends on who operates there first, and whether they treat the far side as a scientific sanctuary or an industrial hub.
Security and space domain awareness
Military value at the Moon may be limited in the near term, but situational awareness is another story. Tracking objects in cislunar space is strategically significant. The U.S. is field-testing Oracle, a system to catalog traffic and hazards out to lunar distances.
First movers have the opportunity to establish traffic management practices, like requiring lighting, transponders, and reporting to reduce risks and shape how cislunar space is governed.
Economy and industry: Momentum matters
NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services program is already buying robotic deliveries from private companies. Intuitive Machines returned the U.S. to the lunar surface in February 2024, with more missions in line. A crewed Artemis landing would cement American vendors in the lunar economy.
At the same time, U.S. policy supports private rights to extracted space resources, while avoiding sovereignty claims. Early, visible operations would help make that framework the lived reality on the ground.
Prestige, alliances, and symbolism
Symbolism matters, too. Congress has explicitly linked getting Americans back to the Moon before China to U.S. global leadership and to keeping Artemis partners aligned.
A Chinese first landing, by contrast, could energize ILRS recruitment and boost Beijing’s prestige, even without changing the legal picture.
What If China lands first?
If China achieves a crewed landing before the U.S. returns, the most likely outcomes are:
- Narrative and recruiting. Beijing would strengthen ILRS credibility and likely attract more partners.
- Standards and networks. Chinese infrastructure like Queqiao-2 could become the default for ILRS members, complicating future interoperability.
- Site congestion. Occupying the few power-rich ridges near ice could complicate later planning and require more deconfliction.
What it would not do is confer legal sovereignty. The Outer Space Treaty still applies. But the practical advantage lies in being the one who writes the first chapters of the operating manual.
Where the U.S. program stands
NASA’s timeline remains tight.
- Artemis 2, the program’s first crewed lunar flyby, is set for “no later than April 2026.”
- Artemis 3, the program’s first crewed landing, is scheduled for “no earlier than mid-2027,” with technical challenges with Orion’s heat shield and SpaceX’s Human Landing System still ongoing.
Delays make the race with China’s own 2030 human landing target more uncertain. Every slip raises the possibility that Beijing gets there first.
The bottom line
Returning first to the Moon does not mean ownership. What it means is influence: over norms, standards, traffic management, and who gathers at which hubs. The tangible stakes include:
- Control of communications and navigation standards.
- Early presence on scarce south pole real estate.
- Reputation and alliances.
- Momentum to sustain America’s industrial and scientific leadership.
If China lands first, the U.S. is not locked out, but it would be reacting to someone else’s framework in the most valuable neighborhoods.
Does racing China to the Moon affect the race to Mars?
Indirectly, yes. The Moon is the testbed for Mars. If China establishes south pole sites and seeds its own infrastructure, U.S. partners may face fragmented systems, slowing the cooperative logistics a Mars program demands.
By contrast, a U.S.-led Artemis foothold means LunaNet standards, interoperable docking and refueling, and shared power grids. This creates a cislunar “grid,” a staging area close to Earth that can feed Mars missions at scale.
Whoever defines the playbook at the Moon would likely influence the framework Mars inherits.
What to watch: Is ‘Moon first’ helping Mars?
Key milestones that show progress toward Mars include:
- Large-scale orbital refueling demonstrations tied to Artemis landers.
- Gateway habitation intervals that yield real radiation and life-support data.
- Fission surface power contracts moving toward lunar demonstration hardware.
- Revived polar resource campaigns to map and mine water ice.
- Annual Moon-to-Mars architecture updates that link each Artemis milestone to a specific Mars risk retirement.
One line that sums it up
The Moon, though only a three-day journey, holds decisions that will likely influence voyages lasting years. Establishing norms and infrastructure there isn’t merely about returning to the lunar surface; it’s about pioneering the path to Mars.
